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ABSTRACT
Germany emerged from post-war Europe economically, politically, and culturally devastated. The
process of rebuilding the state meant severing German society from its pre-war roots, changing
international and domestic acuity of the German people as violent and racially defined. These postwar leaders, however, were unable to convincingly portray and create a modern nation to shatter the
myth of German origins, and accordingly shifted the blame for Germany’s situation on Nazi leaders.
Absolution of the German people meant denying opportunities for popular self-critique, creating an
atmosphere which unwittingly condoned the Romantic national myth. Earlier articulated by the
Nazis, this original movement urged Germans to purify and worship the ethnie, granting the state the
ability to provide cultural protection, sanctioning racism, prejudice, and bias. The persistence of this
ideology in post-war Germany, coupled with economic concerns and the instrumental inability to redefine the German nation led to programs aimed at shattering perceptions of racial ideals and cultural
hatreds of the “other,” rather than terminating the root cause of these biases. Tendencies to imagine
the purity of a past Germany as extant, therefore, support Romantic popular images and feelings for a
German nation that never actually existed. In contemporary Germany, the this inability to re-define
the national ideology and myth leads to a continuation of fear and violence towards minorities and
“others,” an issue frequently magnified by popular action and political rhetoric.
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CHAPTER 1
UNKNOWN FEAR: CULTURAL DEVIENCY AND THE NATIONAL MYTH

The incident on the Düsseldorf rail line that happened on the afternoon of July 18, 2000
surprised, but inevitably did not shock, the people of Germany. During the early minutes of the
afternoon rush hour commute, the footbridge at the downtown Am Wehrhan train station crowded
with a group of students exiting their German-language class as they headed for the afternoon train to
take them home.1 The façade of regularity – indicated by thick warm air, overlapping voices, and
rumbling trains - was shattered by the heat, sound, and shock of an intense chemical reaction. The
deafening roar of the blast was replaced by a sharp ringing in the ears of those closest to the
explosion, insuring that the ensuing panic and devastation would occur in a temporary silence. As
the curtain of smoke lifted, the visible destruction set the scene for pandemonium, a cacophony of
shouting and sirens.
Nine people sustained severe injuries, two critically so, including a man and a pregnant
woman in her twenties who not only miscarried but also lost a leg as the bomb ripped through the
pedestrian bridge.2 Most of the injuries were not caused by the actual blast, but by shards of metal
and other shrapnel placed inside the bomb in order to exact maximum damage within a small radius.3
The majority of those injured shared one significant trait: they were Jewish immigrants from Russia,
Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.4 Presumably the terrorist bombers designed and planned their attack to
target this group of individuals and send a grim message to all the minority groups of Düsseldorf and
Germany at large.
1

Roger Cohen, “Germans Say Nine Wounded by Bomb Were Immigrants,” The New York Times, July 29,
2000, http://www.nytimes.com (accessed 12 February 2008).
2
“Düsseldorf Rail Explosion Likely a Grenade or Bomb, Police Say,” CNN, July 27, 2000,
http://www.cnn.com (accessed 12 February 2008).
3
“Shrapnel Bomb Injures Nine,” BBC News, July 27, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk (accessed 12 February
2008).
4
John Hooper, “Far Right Link Sought After Bomb Blast,” The Guardian, July 29, 2000,
http://www.guardian.co.uk (accessed 12 February 2008).
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At the train station, the scene devolved into chaos and then similarly evolved into familiar
news footage of the faceless enemy lurking within and yet functioning as a part of society. In cases
such as these, the terrorist inevitably possesses a face. His own unique identity initially; and beyond
that a face which represents a growing sentiment and dissatisfaction regarding the current challenges
to the status quo which have been emerging in Germany. Though the perpetrators were never
identified, their actions speak volumes about the prejudices, xenophobia, and racism which continue
to penetrate German society. Historical ideologies and myths about the strength and superiority of
the German nation still persist in the contemporary era, even as the logic and rational for defining the
nation based on racial attributes was shattered at the end of World War II. The German government
and population never concretely re-defined their identity, and now it is being accomplished for them,
from below, by the influx of foreigners and minority groups raised with German socio-cultural
traditions. In many instances, ethnic Germans view this as subversive to their identity and way of
life, lashing out with violence in response to increased levels of forced interaction as minority groups
continue to grow in number and influence.
Rush hour, on any evening in any place, rarely affords one the mental quiet to imagine
anything out of the ordinary. The German town of Düsseldorf, located in the state of NordrheinWestfalen (NRW), in this respect provides no exception to the mad dash of the evening in either the
superficial actions of the event or the symbolic gesture implied by such social interactions. The grit
and grime of a summer city afternoon collides with crisp fabrics – worn by well-heeled businessmen
– that seem to melt in the sweltering heat. A change in climate experienced following the work day
metaphorically creates an impression regarding the dissolution of the barrier between private life and
the reality of “what’s out there,” in the public sphere when class boundaries are removed from the
equation. Rush hour produces something larger and far more important than traffic jams, hot buses,
and crowded train stations. This daily ritual creates within the public sphere what may be the only
true heterogeneous population mixture generated by necessity, where these businessmen share
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transportation and space with petty-bourgeois shopkeepers and wage earners. Private automobiles
shelter the lucky few while buses, taxis, trams, subway cars, and commuter trains transport the
populace of the city regardless of ethnicity, religion, social status, or income. There is nothing
unusual to infer when viewing a white man of high income dressed in the latest designer suit and
reading the newspaper sitting next to a working-class Turkish immigrant wife, running the day’s
errands with small children in tow. These forms of public transportation possess a very Habermasian
quality to them, breaking social barriers and forcing interaction between those individuals and groups
not traditionally given to associating with one another.5
Interaction during the rush hour commute therefore expands the area of the public sphere to
new boundaries not experienced otherwise and creates a forced inclusive society, representing a
microcosm of the interaction between German bourgeoisie and others in this Habermasian space.
German society is arguably comprised of two public spheres, based on dynamic factors of inclusion
and exclusion implemented by the growing numbers of socially and racially differentiated masses.
Throughout modern European history, a very bourgeois public sphere permeated society and set the
standard for values and identity, and Germany was no exception, especially during the revolutionary
era. This idea of a single public sphere rests heavily on the premises of an ethnically homogenous or,
at the very least, inclusive state.

5

See the discussion regarding the public sphere and community interaction by Jürgen Habermas, The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989). The term Habermasian is
used to describe the meeting of the liberal bourgeoisie public sphere with mass society where lines between public
and private, and state and society blur. It can further be argued that this blurring dissolved the public sphere for a
more inclusive popular opinion. Habermas’ work in theorizing the public sphere has proved especially popular in
sociology, political science, and revolutionary France. Though highly influential Habermas received substantial
criticism for everything from his elitist view of the public sphere (i.e., it was not public at all) to his writing style.
Habermas’ dedication to reason, and ethics, and moral philosophy often makes him the target of postmodernist,
poststructuralist, and feminist critics. Edward Said is a vocal critic, often stressing the lack that critical theory and
cultural criticism theorists take to curb or recognize oppression. Said implicates the entire Frankfurt School, and
pointedly Habermas. Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1994). Gordon Welty harshly
accused Habermas of “failing to recognize the signifigence of social classes and antagonism for morality and
personality.” Gordon Welty, "A Critique of Habermas' Proposed 'Reconstruction of Historical Materialism',"
presented to the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (August 17, 1989), http://www.wright.edu/~gordon.welty.
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In the post-war era, the reality of German society provided no such basis for homogeneity
and instead points toward a reluctance to create such inclusion. Migrants to Germany therefore found
themselves inside of the state but outside of society, confronting cultural segregation hardened and
enforced by the government’s official policies regarding the presence of Gastarbeiter. The official
government policies were enhanced by the ethnic German public’s own desires for community
preservation, a feeling that persisted long after the relaxation of Germany’s immigration laws in
2001.6 Survival for these ethnic minorities depended upon the creation of social hierarchies and
cultural values that bound them together in a sphere mirroring and paralleling that of the German
sphere. These two spheres exist within the same state simultaneously yet separately with one hoping
to merge and thrive with the other, and one hoping to alienate the “other”. The two rarely willfully
interact except for such necessary moments as the commute and use of public transportation.7

It

remains unsurprising then that such forced interaction with “others” - those sections of society
considered cultural non-conformists by individuals who believe themselves representatives of the
cultural norm – leads to increased social tension and acts as a time bomb for explosive moments of
violence.
As a heavily industrialized and western city, Düsseldorf attracts an exceedingly large
percentage of immigrants as it is the capital of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany’s most populous
state.8 The potential economic growth of the region consistently offers the possibility of perpetual
job creation and the chance to improve levels of wealth and education. Economic issues coupled
with the steadily growing tide of immigrants to the country in the wake of World War II created

6

Gastarbeiter – “guest worker/s” refers to the German term for laborers recruited to live and work in
Germany on a temporary basis by the government. Originally the majority of these workers hailed from Eastern
Europe and the Middle East, though the majority is now mostly comprised of citizens from the Middle East and
North Africa.
7
The use of public as pertaining to transportation should not be confused with the Habermasian use of the
word pertaining to intellectual debate and the definition of national culture.
8
The population of Nordrhein-Westfalen sits at around 18 million people. Ministerium für Umwelt und
Naturshutz, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschutz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, “Action Programme
Environment,” n.d., http://www.apug.nrw.de/pdf/Outcomes_2002-2007.pdf (accessed 7 February 2008).
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special problems regarding the highly volatile issues of nationalism and xenophobia. Germany’s
economic needs after World War II and the negative natural population growth rate over the last few
decades meant that the state relied upon and still needs a constant influx of foreigners to support the
“economic miracle.”9 Their acceptance into German society however, remains anything but a
smooth process, creating social antagonisms and causing former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to
convey his disgust in “reading almost every day about orgies of violence by right-wing gangs against
foreigners or minorities.”10 Within the scope of Western Europe, Germany does not represent an
isolated case when it comes to experiencing contemporary solvency of the nation, as French and
English governments also struggle to deal with a rising tide of immigration and increased social
conflict. The transference of social customs, practices, and habits by an immigrant population sets
the scene for a clash of nations, or in the extreme case civilizations, within the state.11 Inhabitants of
traditionally European national origin often find themselves taking a reactionary position toward the
influx of foreigners perceived to be diluting the purity of and desacralizing existing values and
traditions. The phenomenon of anti-immigrant violence – at heart racially motivated – in Germany is
especially significant given its Nazi past. Inevitably, the historical implications of such racially –
based forms of violence makes Germany unique within Europe and this Sonderweg (special way)
provides continuity of ideology and development that continues into the contemporary era.12 The
9

According to the U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base, the German population in 1950 stood at
68,374,572 and in 2008 is 82,369,548. Currently the calculated rate of natural increase of population is -0.26%, and
has been negative for the several previous years as well. U.S. Census Bureau, “International Census Database,”
Germany, http://www.census.gov (accessed 14 June 2008).
10
“Germany Agonises over Bomb Attack,” BBC News, 30 July 2000., http://www.bbc.co.uk (accessed 12
February 2008).
11
See the arguments presented by Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003).
12
The Sonderweg is a distinctive and controversial topic in German historiography which emphasizes that
German-speaking territories have developed along a unique trajectory in modern European history. Germany’s
desire to find a “third way” between western-style democracy and eastern-style Tsarist governments guided its path
from aristocracy to democracy. World War I is considered a direct outcome of the Sonderweg, and more recent
studies emphasize the National Socialist movement and World War II as part of Germanic historical continuity.
Scholarship on the subject generally began in the two decades following the war when the debate was polarized
between non-German and German historians. A.J.P. Taylor (The Course of German History, 2nd ed. 1945), pp. 213)
notably argued that the Third Reich was “a tyranny imposed upon the German people by themselves,” and this
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ideology and subsequent practices of the Nazi Party pushed national purity to its most extreme
conclusion during World War II, violently attempting to eliminate those elements of society
considered to be “other,” external to German identity and therefore undesirable.
These ideas regarding the racial homogeneity of Germany however, emerged in the century
prior to the Nazi regime, rooted in works by thinkers from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (17701831) to Paul de Legarde (1827-1891). These writers used the tools of history and philosophy to
discern and describe the origins and components of the true German nation. Swept up in the tide of
nineteenth-century romanticism, this brand of intellectuals looked to pastoral and rural historical
settings to discover the natural national elements unspoiled by the onslaught of modernity. The
nation was considered an organic structure with the function of preserving and protecting peoples
with common cultures, distinguished especially by what may be considered the most organic and

sentiment was re-enforced by Edmond Vermeil (L'Allemagne contemporaine, 1952). German historians such as
Friedrich Meinecke (The German Catastrophe, trans. 1950) presented Nazi Germany as an accident of history and
generally unrepeatable, and Henry Ashby Turner (Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 1997) echoed these sentiments as
the intellectual heir to the movement. Since the 1960s, the idea of Sonderweg has become more acceptable in
mainstream historical study and many different versions of the theory began to emerge. Historian Fritz Fischer
(Germany’s Aims in the First World War, trans. 1967) explored the Sonderweg through the lens of partial
modernization, viewing the failure of the liberal revolution of 1948 as the crucial turning point. Fritz Stern (The
Politics of Cultural Despair, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) and George L. Mosse (Nationalization
of the Masses, New York: Howard Fertig, 2001) viewed the culprit as virulent anti-Semitism embraced by the
cultural elites in their rejection of modernity. Currently, Jürgen Kocka (“German History before Hitler: the Debate
About the German Sonderweg, 1988) is one of the most vocal proponent of the Sonderweg, speaking out about the
importance of cultural and political varients to argue against Michael Stürmer’s (“History In a Land Without
History?” 1993) theory of a geographic reason for Germany’s special development. The most extreme scholarship
utilizing Sonderweg argues that the political and social evolution of Germany in the modern era was such that no
outcome but the resulting Nazi regime was plausible. In the most current scholarship regarding Nazi Germany,
Daniel Goldhagen (Hitler’s Willing Executioners, 1996) is given credit for reviving debate about the subject when
he argued that Germany is characterized by extreme anti-Semitism. Sonderweg theory still has many detractors who
do not recognize Germany an historically special case. Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn are generally recognized
as the leading critics of Sonderweg theory. Though a slightly older work, their book The Peculiarities of German
History (1984) lays out the influential argument that historical development has no “normal” path, and therefore the
German case cannot be unique. Many who deny the Sonderweg thesis believe it does not take into account
similarities and differences with other violent regimes and dictatorships. For the most recent scholarship that is not
yet included in the major historiography see Helmut Walser Smith, The Continuities of German History: Nation,
Religion, and Race Across the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Geoff
Eley and Jan Palmowski, eds., Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2007); Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, “The Pre-History of the Holocaust? The Sonderweg and
Historikerstreit Debates and the Abject Colonial Past,” Central European History 41, no. 3 (2008), 477-503.
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basic identifying marker of culture: language.13 Intellectuals extolled the virtues of not only
languages as ageless and superior in terms of cultural comparison, but often relied upon the emerging
field of biological sciences to apply these same qualities to the race which they belonged. An
incipient understanding of the differences between different social groupings (race, class, etc.)
characterized this goal for racial homogeneity, which predated the emergence of social Darwinism,
and later incorporated the pseudo-science emerging in the1860s.14
Bastardized versions of Darwinian evolution appeared in both forms of theoretical and
scientific evidence for supporting the inherent physically superior (biological) characteristics of the
Germanic race, reinforcing the idea of the nation as having organic origins. This organic nationalism
originated during the mid-nineteenth century turmoil of state-building as an effort to enthuse people
of separate principalities about the necessity for cultural unification and transference of the natural
strength of the nation into a large state structure capable of dominating continental politics and acting
as a cultural container. Transference from the fractured town, city, and principality-based
allegiances/identities to the state level could only occur at the behest of the nation, thus cementing
the use of popular nationalism as the driving force behind politicized romanticism and setting a
precedent for the proper use and function of the nation in generating congruencies between it and the
state. Congruency between the cultural and political units represents the culmination of nationalism,
where each unit informs the decisions and actions of the other. 15 Though the German states
officially unified in 1871, such congruency was not achieved, leaving the German
nationalist/intellectual movement wholly unfulfilled.

13

Many authors tackle the role of language in the process of state building. For an excellent reference see
David A. Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001).
14
Stephen Tomlinson, Head Masters: Phrenology, Secular Education, and Nineteenth Century Social
Thought (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005). Tomlinson’s work is dedicated to tracing the use of
pseudoscientific theories and how their status as a valid educational and biological concept impacted the
development of social theory in the late nineteenth century.
15
Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1983), 3.
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Thus the necessity for such race-based doctrines would remain central to the course of
German unity. The most discussed and relevant of these events remains the World War II era, with
the Nazi consolidation of power and process of territorial expansion set in motion in the 1930s. The
National Socialist party generally built its platform around the basic understanding of national
supremacy expressed through acceptable physical standards, but took on a more sinister application
through the legislation of these attributes. Only those persons legally defined as physically and
ethnically German received classification of citizen, thus relegating state membership to a biological
qualification. The Nazis also desired to identify the biological “other,” and to eliminate these newly
identified and legislatively proscribed societal outcasts altogether. The program of National
Socialism ultimately distinguishes itself in German history as the period responsible for pushing the
ideological combination of romantic nationalism and social Darwinism to its most extreme limits. It
is at this inception of the Nazi program where arguments in the historiography become pertinent in
understanding the implication behind the implementation of a Fascist program by the state and
manipulation of nationalism by political leaders.
Traditionally, many authors focused their efforts on discerning the primordial characteristics
of nationalism, wherein the nation is a cultural component, existing independently of mandated
actions and growing out of ethnic kinship, ancient tradition, and symbolism. In the mind of the true
primordialist intellectual, nations possess “navels,” a defined and central cultural core which comes
into existence at no definitive emerging date, but does pre-date the modern era by centuries or even
millennia.16 Conversely, modernists believe the emergence of the nation received guidance from the
intellectual traditions of modernism in its formation and relied on the presence of an existing state
apparatus to develop control. These scholars typically adhere to an instrumentalist approach; they
attribute modern characteristics of the state as a means for reaching conclusions about the state’s role
16

For more in depth information on debates regarding the application of the “navel” to the nation see:
Ernest Gellner and Anthony D. Smith. "The Nation: Real or Imagined?: The Warwick Debates on Nationalism."
Nations and Nationalism 2, no. 3 (1996): 367-368.
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in the distribution and creation of a national culture. These premises lead modernists to the
conclusion that the nation does not really exist as a cultural entity, but rather is a fictional construct
manipulated by the state as a means to a political end.
Very closely tied to this historiographical argument about the nature of the relationship
between the nation and state is the intertwining historiography regarding the functionalist versus
intentionalist schools of interpretation used in determining the role of Fascism as a socio-political
ideology.17 Understanding and providing conclusions regarding this debate over the origins of the
nation feeds into the larger external conversation pertaining to the nature and role of Fascism. The
functionality or intentionalism behind Fascism – specifically whether state goals evolved over time
or if a fully formed plan existed from the inception of the party, respectively – can either enhance the
primordialist or modernist stance, depending on the initial conclusion.
Fascism as political ideology was not unique to Germany, but its conception in the form of
National Socialism remains sui generis. While the Nazi example is too extraordinary to use as a
useful comparative model, one must understand Fascism in order to comprehend fully the role of the
nation in Nazi Germany and in the post-war era. Fascism here finds no limitations or
compartmentalization in purely functionalist or intentionalist logic and is, in fact, rather a synthesis
of the two schools, where functionalism is a component of intentionalism. The relationship between
functionalism and intentionalism is better described as a process, a process which is linear with the
ultimate goal revolving around a constructed idea of national supremacy and dominance through a
vague idea of eliminating the “other”.
Extermination was a means to that ultimate end; means are by definition an available
opportunity and develop as unfolding conditions enhance or restrain the means of the end-goal. The
sheer scope and scale of the intended goal (elimination) made it impossible for the National Socialist
party to apply and adhere to only one process for implementing a pure nation-state. The complexity
17

See the further discussion presented in Chapter 2 of this paper.
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of the goal forced the means to evolve and the top-heavy organization that marked the German
bureaucracy made the process of evolution of the means simpler and more coherent. A synthetic
process like this essentially made the state an instrumental opportunist for implementing longstanding German philosophic traditions and pseudo-scientific theories describing the ideal nation or
more specifically an ideal Germany.
German political parties and the state structure merely existed as a conduit for further
disseminating ideals about the nation which were already quite prevalent in German society and
existed well in advance of the emergence of the Fascist system of government. National Socialism
then did not generate the idea of the nation based on common culture and biological origin, but
instead worked to make such an idea politically relevant and fully cement the bond between nation
and state, reigniting nationalist fervor. In Nazi Germany, the nation still possessed a navel where the
state merely acted as a body to protect and surround the nativist construction of the nation, bringing
nineteenth-century organic nationalism into the twentieth. With this understanding in mind, the
immediate post-war years in Germany are of key importance to explaining the role of the nation,
citizenship, race, and violence during the state’s contemporary development and existence.
Over approximately the next fifteen years, security remained the primary concern and
responsibility of the Allied powers, and confrontation with the Deutsche Demokratische Republik
(DDR) remained limited until the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. For eleven years, the
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD) citizens and politicians maintained the luxury and ability to turn
their attention inward and focus on domestic social and economic policy, in effect rebuilding the
domestic infrastructure of the state from the ground up – a decidedly gargantuan task. Politicians in
the immediate post-war period stood amid a crumbled Germany, overshadowed by the actions of
their predecessors, those Nazi giants. The job of emerging political leaders at the time revolved
around the capability to visualize the German state in an entirely new light, including politics,
economics, society, and the nation itself. The majority of the years from 1945-61 therefore saw
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much energy put into plans for breaking away from the organic national core and systematically and
instrumentally using the state to replace the old historical interpretations of German nationalism with
an innovative contemporary one.
This attempt to redefine German national identity in the post-World War II era consisted
primarily of a conscious effort on the part of political elites to inoculate Germany, and thus its entire
image, from the racist component which scarred it. Newly appointed and elected politicians
generally found that after the war they had no choice but to drastically alter the perception of the
German nation both at home and abroad. The requirement to rebuild Germany as an organized
society or state, especially economically and politically, remained the most pressing issue at hand in
the immediate aftermath of the war. Losing the war and the ensuing occupation led to fierce political
divisions within the country, partially fueled by dissatisfaction with the promises and subsequent
failures of Hitler’s National Socialism. Parallel to this internal strife, German leaders also received a
clear message from the international community: lack of political change would only hinder
Germany’s acceptance back into the world system. Following the Nazi era of outright hostility and
disregard for international law, German politicians needed to illustrate the state’s ability for
international cooperation. Any program implemented hinting at strains of a fascist or national
socialist platform in any way obtained no collective internal or external support. This new German
political platform effectively needed to generate an idea of the nation through the use of policies
which actively opposed the race-based agenda of the previous eras in German history.
It is precisely at this point where the system of nationalism attempted to shift from the
organic “navel” form to a centrally created and instrumentally defined version of the nation. These
changes to the German state originating in the 1950s and their impact upon the nation have become
increasingly relevant to the function and composition of contemporary German society. In effect, the
state apparatus of post-World War II Germany actively attempted to revise the perception of the
nation and the meaning of “German” without changing the definition, with mixed results. Over the
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course of the next several decades, the BRD government made a calculated effort to revise
Germany’s image domestically and internationally. This new conceptualization focused on a shift
from international aggression to cooperation quite successfully, though a movement away from an
official race-based national definition to a different model in post-modern German society proved
difficult.
The 1980s, however, placed this revisionism under an academic microscope forcing the issue
as a means for addressing larger questions – about race, citizenship, and nationalism - through the
lens of revisionism’s role in creating new social constructs and its impact upon the general
population. Such questions made research pertaining to the operation of post-modern German
nationalism increasingly relevant and academically pertinent. Opened in the summer of 1986 by
Jürgen Habermas, the Historikerstreit (Historian’s conflict/quarrel) centered on the historical revision
of German history designed to meet the “perceived need of fostering a new German nationalism as a
means of legitimation.”18 Habermas argued that the political instrumentalism which attempted to
introduce a shift in values in the political establishment and a corresponding shift in national
consciousness forestalled any chance for critical self-reflection by the general population upon their
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role in Nazi atrocities.19 Bypassing this critical step only generated a severe lack of understanding
regarding German actions during World War II, creating disconnects between state (government) and
nation (populace) on the issue of blame. It furthermore allowed for the continuation of racial biases
and the “othering” of minorities within German society, because when the general population
receives little blame and is not subject to the same scrutiny and introspection as the government,
there is no reason to perceive such biases as a fault. This further provided opportunities for
recidivistic, nationalistic, and even crypto-Nazi movements to emerge as the change in national
identity was superficial.
Revisionists answered the charge in a truly weak fashion, declaring the era of Nazism an
unrepeatable accident of German history, and emphasized the role of dominant individuals, such as
Hitler, et al. Indicating that Nazism was an unrepeatable accident allowed historians to ignore the
need for Habermas’ self-critique, and therefore bypass an opportunity to examine the historical
connections between Third Reich policies and its predecessors. Without such an examination,
proving the “accidental” thesis would be impossible.
The revisionist position had already been (or was further eroded) by earlier works. Most
significantly, Fritz Fischer’s Der Griff nach der Weltmach (Germany’s Aims in the First World
War), illustrated the clear continuity between Wilhelmian and Nazi era imperialist and military
aspirations.20 In light of such criticism, Christian Democratic party efforts to develop an entirely new
conceptualization of Germany are even more significant in their attempts to completely break with
Germany’s past, while ignoring the realities of this past. Stepping down from Nazi shoulders meant
a recreation of contemporary German society rather than a regression to Wilhelmian era (pre-Nazi)
Romantic Nationalist social norms, which inherently lacked an element of realism, and a self-critique
of those norms.
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This thesis aims to explore this instrumental attempt at recreation as well as its outcomes and
implications for the future of Germany. Much of this work is dedicated to German history prior to
the end of World War II as a means for making an argument regarding the continuity of the German
national myth in modern history. The Nazis used Romantic nationalism and the national myth to
further their political means, illustrating both why reverting to nationalist ideology in the post-war
era remained unfeasible and the state forced this radical transition on the population. The second part
of this thesis concentrates on the tactics used by state-level politicians to achieve the goal of national
redefinition along with their success and failure in both the international and domestic spheres,
respectively. Finally this paper closes with a reflection upon the historical significance governing
Germany’s national myths, both traditional and new, as well as what this means for the future of
German society as it further integrates itself into Europe and the international community. In the
end, studies in nationalism may very well prove the most successful tool for making sense of a
disconcordant and incongruous German society in the twentieth-century.
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CHAPTER 2
SYNTHESIZING THEORY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATION

Relatively new in comparison to other fields of history, the historiography of nationalism
tends to lack a complex established philosophical tradition capable of stressing its importance to the
broader field. Indeed nationalism is a force at the root of how people define themselves, explain their
origins, and create cohesive cultural units, leaving historians to make sense of nationalism in the face
of vague definitions and broad implications inherent in its study. Historians now work to posit the
events of the past in such a way that helps shape the understanding of the present and future of
society. This is coupled with explanations about the historical origins of nationalism that leads to
vastly different ideological interpretations about how to define and utilize nationalism. Prior to the
twentieth century, most writings on nationalism consisted of foundational documents written by the
likes of Jules Michelet, Giuseppe Mazzini, and other theorists, focusing on the implementation of
popular sovereignty to remedy the ills of the absolutist state. Only in the wake of global conflicts
where states used the values of the nation as a weapon did nationalism become a serious issue
requiring intensive analytical study.
Most scholarly interpretations of nationalism concern themselves with creating an
understanding of what constitutes the essence of nationalism. Doing so requires the application of
several questions: can nationalism be defined, from where does it originate, what role does it play in
society, and finally how does it inspire involvement. The existing major schools of thought revolve
around two competing theories regarding the origins of nationalism. Scholars as diverse as Anthony
Smith, Ernst Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and many others approach nationalism from either a
primordialist (with biological roots now inherent with no record of inception of these qualities) or
modernist (politics gave the nation reason or cause to exist, the nation is a derivative of the state)
stance. Since a definition of nationalism is so elusive, historians of nationalism seek to quantify the
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term in absolutes by applying popular versus official, process versus state of being, and
constructionist versus devolutionist arguments to the schools of thought. The definitions provided by
theorists easily differentiate the two schools, though they each are capable of broadly describing a
variety of situations. While neither primordialism nor modernism has established dominance within
the field, it is increasingly apparent that the modernist approach has become gradually more popular.
Perhaps the most effective means to understanding the competing schools of interpretation is to
examine the major theorists and their arguments.
The earliest of these modern theorists was Hans Kohn, whose most fundamental belief is that
the nation is a state of mind. Although this does sound similar to the arguments made by
primordialists, Kohn makes it clear that this state of mind developed only as a result of modern
institutions and ultimately cannot be recognized prior to the 1750s.21 When prevailing politics and
civic nationalism intersect the nation-state becomes the only viable and ideal form of government.
Political organization and nationality merge as a conscious result of this civic nationalism, generating
the greatest difference between the new citizenship-minded nationalism and the primordial result of
common histories with roots in a distant past.
Louis L. Snyder’s work, The Meaning of Nationalism (1968), received tremendous accolades
upon its release. As a student of Hans Kohn, Snyder was expected to and did follow in Kohn’s
intellectual path, viewing nationalism as ultimately a modern phenomenon. Snyder agrees with
Kohn that nationalism was not a potent force in history until the French Revolution confirmed the
incompatibility of absolute monarchy and popular sovereignty, providing the framework for
nationalism as an important political tool which supports the will of the people. He furthers argues
nationalism as an entity is so closely tied to modernity that it is sui generis and therefore contains no
equivalent at any point in history prior to its conceptualization in the eighteenth century.22

21
22

Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1965).
Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968).

25

In his second work Nations and Nationalism (1983), Ernst Gellner established himself as one
of the preeminent modernists. He maintained that nationalism was enabled by the emergence of
modernity, itself a product of the revolution in politics and economics. For Gellner, nationalism is
best described as a constructionist process from above fueled by the transition to modernity.23
Gellner retained his status as the most influential of the modernists by arguing that the change from
agrarianism to industrialism prompted a similar shift in the social structure as well. Therefore
changes in the economic system are primarily responsible for changes in the social structure. These
rapid shifts required greater political involvement in the maintenance of social stability in the face of
change caused by increased class and spatial mobility and a decrease in the social distance between
classes. Political action by the elites led to a deep relationship between the political and cultural
units, breeding national sentiment. Despite obvious lacunae – role of state violence and persistence
of separatist movements – Gellner’s work is one of the most solid and influential of the modernist
school.
Eric Hobsbawm remains the other pillar of modernist thought, whose work Nations and
Nationalism since 1780 (1990) examines the role of the nation primarily in regards to the
implementation of and claims to citizenship. Nationalism as an entity changes greatly from its premodern form in this relationship because it belongs to a historically recent period, where conscious
involvement in the nation becomes increasingly important to identity. The nation is a social entity as
it relates to the modern concept of territory and sovereignty and so is deeply intertwined with the
state apparatus. Because the role and acceptance of a citizen is confined to the activities of the state,
the question of nationality exists at the intersection of politics and the transformation of the state
from a purely political entity to a national entity. Being a national becomes tantamount to obtaining
citizenship because these identities are constructed primarily from above and people must conform to
23
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the standards set by the state in order to be a part of the nation as well. Hobsbawm does argues that,
though the nation can be constructed from below, this intersection of politics and transformation can
also be analyzed in terms of a state because blanket implementation of citizenship removes the
element of a pre-determined nationality from below. Importantly though, the state only possesses
this power regarding the nation because the population gave their consent through active
participation. Hobsbawm further posits that modern consciousness separates shared history from the
modern reliance on nationalism to allow individuals to join forces.24 In this way nationalism differs
from common permanent group identities, such as family or religion, often mistakenly used as
identifiers for the nation.
Primordialists offer a different interpretation of nationalism, one that concentrates on the premodern evocation of blood, kinship, and ethnicity. Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities
(1983) explores the idea that nationalism represents a popular constructive state of being where the
ideology of nationalism is subject to the demands of society and evolves out of the imagined
communities. The communities, Anderson argues, are only conscious in their modern form but in
fact possess an antique quality.25 Community operates as an abstract concept, stemming from a
shared feeling or understanding of mutual existence that that state apparatus cannot replicate. The
characteristic of language bound people together, existing as an important factor since times previous
to recorded history. This language possesses antique qualities, but the model created by
incorporating this vernacular into print created political and social models with a highly popular
character. Language for Anderson is the ultimate mythical symbol promoting a common origin.
Print, not economic changes imposed by the state, changed the nature of spatial relationships,
bringing individuals closer together and binding them together through nationalism. The vernacular
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is the means of communication for the majority of the population, connecting them as a Volk with
deep roots finally being utilized for the first time. Anderson’s argument lies clearly in favor of
primordialism with a nationalism originating from the people, or the nation possessing a “navel.”26
If authors like Gellner characterize the typical modernist, then Anthony D. Smith plays the
same role for primordialism. In Smith’s mind, nationalism possesses the most primitive of origins,
what he terms the ethnie. The pre-modern existence of an ethnicity is primarily responsible for the
creation of a collective identity. Warfare and religion both influence the creation of this common
ethnic sentiment, as the emotion from both components consistently undergo a process of integration,
a process which continues through the interpretations of subsequent generations in the common
memory of an ethnie.27 From this process comes a linear myth of descent or origin, from the
combined cognitive maps of history, reliant on the expression of solidarity. Myths of cultural origin
are highly dependent upon the diffusion of symbols as a means for maintaining recognition of a
social bond. Smith sees durability between the pre-modern ethnie and its modern form, the nation,
which must supplant a pre-modern dominant ethnie while incorporating its symbols and continually
disseminating myths of origin. This is a classic argument of the possession of an ethnic core by the
nation and promotes the idea that “nations have navels” as Mazzini earlier suggested, and negates the
nation as an inevitable product of modernity.
Though highly polarized, this debate provides a context for analyzing those political
movements which use the ideology of nationalism to advance their rhetoric. One of the more
predominant political movements of the twentieth century, Fascism, did so with severe repercussions.
The issue of Fascism itself continues to generate conclusions regarding its role in the shaping of
European and other twentieth-century experiences long after World War II. Vague understanding of
the term coupled with an inability to reach an agreement regarding the purpose, origins, and meaning
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of nationalism leads to lively academic debate, driving the historiography of Fascism forward. An
attempt to answer these questions creates space for three major applications of the problems and
issue surrounding Fascism. Firstly are those writings focusing on the general meaning of Fascism
and obtaining a definition derived from theoretical applications to the subject.
Beyond the more abstract discussion of the nation is a system of argument derived from two
major debates occurring within the current historiography of Fascism. Arguably, the debate here is
that of functionalist versus intentionalist schools of interpretation; that is, determining whether
Fascist state goals evolved or whether a fully formed plan existed at the ideology’s inception. The
next debate is smaller but is no less important in its outlook, that of populism versus instrumentalism.
Both are important issues when addressing the role of the people; whether they consciously act on
behalf of the will of the leader or are used as unknowing tools by the regime. None of these subjects
is simplistic in its approach or scope, requiring the incorporation of complex matrices of causality
and effect. The conclusions drawn may not merely be as neat as desired, but what is offered contains
several implications for not only how Fascism is viewed as a historical incident, but also what it
means in terms of the possibilities of a reoccurrence of Fascism in the present and future.
Fascism as a theory or political ideology is notoriously difficult to define, as evidenced by the
main competing interpretations available based on many broad, and often inconclusive,
generalizations. For depictions of the characteristics and meaning of Fascism, Robert Paxton and
George Mosse offer their theories in the work The Anatomy of Fascism (2004) and The Fascist
Revolution: Towards a General Theory of Fascism (2000), respectively. Both authors intend to
illustrate the meaning of Fascism by using historical events to understand how certain actions work
to define Fascism, as well as what the implication of these definitions is for the era of Fascism’s
development and the present. According to Paxton, certain cultures contain no pre-disposition to
Fascism, and indeed the program acts as a source of political relief, a process capable of closing gaps
in the political spectrum and providing a solid foundation in the face of cultural and economic

29

upheaval.28 This allows for a greater understanding as to why Fascism is not a geographically
defined phenomenon. It is not static because the paradox of modernity and on-going contradictions
between rhetoric and practice create fluidity where every situation earns a response from nationalism.
Fascism, for Paxton, is defined as a form of political behavior where the popular masses committed
to the nation are preoccupied with community decline and abandon democratic liberties to pursue
redemptive violence.29
Paxton is a leading scholar in this debate, though like other contemporary authors the work
lacks the qualifications of an intellectually-based antecedent and influence, as skillfully argued in
Fritz Stern’s The Politics of Cultural Despair (1974).30 Stern argues that the intellectual trends for
romanticizing an imagined pastoral past served the Nazis very well. This culminated in the public
acceptance of the Nazi platform and gave them the votes needed to capture the election of March
1933 and, soon after, the government. By using this point of view, Stern makes the connection
between the era leading up to the end of Weimar and the beginning of Nazi Germany. The Nazis
then did not radically break with the past, but rather implemented their idealized version of a
historically purified German nation, which satisfied the desires verbalized by the general population
Many historians of Fascism find convincing arguments that the ideology was highly
intentionalist in nature, revolving around a pre-determined program, imagined and implemented
under the direction and oversight of a single individual. In this case intentionalism argues that Hitler
directly planned and perpetuated the nightmare of the Holocaust. Some authors such as Brigitte
Hamann (Hitler’s Vienna, 1999) concentrate on the early years of Hitler’s life, arguing that this
period and the time spent in Vienna by Hitler as a young man were formative in shaping his
viewpoint of the minority populations. Hamann presents a case for Hitler’s lack of anti-Semitism in
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the period of 1903-1913, but simultaneously reinforces his hatred of all things non-German.31
Intentionalists also tend to use Hitler’s years in Vienna as the basis for his hatred of Jews, as
evidenced in his own personal account in Mein Kampf. For these historians, this writing is
tantamount to a confession of a desire to obliterate the Jewish population even before Hitler assumed
political office. Other authors such as Gerald Fleming (Hitler and the Final Solution, 1984) used the
events of the Holocaust to further the intentionalist position, arguing that the killing of Jews was
deliberate due to the long-standing intentions of Hitler, not because the program slowly unfolded as a
necessity for dealing with the mass numbers of Jews being transported to the East.32 In Hitler’s
World View (1972), Eberhard Jäckel capitalizes on this and takes the position that Hitler’s
understanding of the world was rigidly fixed and that his Weltanschauung revolved around an epic
struggle between the Aryan race and all others.33
The intentionalist argument maintains that Fascism’s program of violent racism is always
intentional and an ever evolving political tool, and relies upon the immediate need for conflict as a
means of national preservation. Ultimately the most popular position, these writers answer the Final
Solution arose because of Hitler’s desires. Functionalists continue to believe intentionalism lacks
nuance, and authors such as Christopher Browning (Ordinary Men, 1993) therefore continue to argue
that the Nazis resorted to genocide only when the initial means used to expel the Jews from Europe
resulted in failure.34 Increasingly though, there can be a measure taken to create a synthesis between
the two ideas, with an intentionalist and vague understanding of elimination of the Jews carried out in
its ultimate form of genocide as continually developed by evolving functionalist means.
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The second central debate in Fascist historiography focuses on the role of the general
population in the implementation of Fascist programs. Once again, Nazi Germany provides a key
example in this trend. Two books, one by Thomas Childers (The Nazi Voter, 1983) and the other by
William Sheridan Allen (The Nazi Seizure of Power, 1984), focus on the role of a very diverse crosssection and localized area of the population, respectively. Childers argues that the Nazi voting base
contained much more class diversity than initially realized, and continually shifted to match changes
in the economic and political spheres.35 As a result, people consciously looked to the Nazi party and
voted for them in an effort to ease the mounting tensions of economic uncertainty and social
upheaval. New voters continually found themselves attracted to the anti-modernity rhetoric of the
Nazis, and the destabilization of the traditional middle-class voting bloc only increased this effect.
Though Allen perpetuates the idea of consistent middle-class support, he wholly supports the
populist standpoint that the local popular level was central to establishing the Nazi seizure of power.
Propaganda techniques, financing, and amount of assistance given to local Nazis all created a
consequence of the townspeople cementing a belief structure in the Nazi party based on the middleclass psychological fear of economic and political disintegration within their town.36 In either case,
and no matter the class, populism maintains that the German people bore responsibility for allowing
the Nazi regime to gain power and flourish in the interwar years. The population identified with
messages targeting external and internal enemies of the state who weakened the German people, as
well as pledges to solidify the nation and make Germany strong again.
As the functionalist perspective garners adherence, many authors continue to maintain the
instrumentalist standpoint. Here, the people bear no direct liability for the actions of their
government, but rather are victims of intense propaganda and indoctrination, forcing them to
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accommodate, accept, and participate in the violent nationalism promulgated by the Nazis. The book
Hitler’s Army (1992) by Omar Bartov is an excellent example of this view. Bartov argues that as the
German war against Russia in the east began to disintegrate, troops became more disorderly,
unstructured, and were unable to perform the will of the Führer. The Nazi leadership imposed a
system of harsh discipline upon military conscripts in an effort to keep the army in fighting
condition. This discipline instilled fear and legitimized barbarism, both of which warped the
soldiers’ ideas of reality and made them weapons and tools of the Nazi regime. Bartov then notes
how the blurring of the lines between military and civilian life made this sort of indoctrination
possible in the civilian sphere as well, giving the Nazis absolute control.37 This directly contradicts
Christopher Browning’s populist approach that soldiers became killers for the Nazis based on
personal will and the desire to maintain a cohesive social framework, avoiding the condemnation of
being labeled an “other.”
As with debates in any realm of academics, it is possible that no single view point can fully
explain the complex and seemingly muddled idea of Fascism, though the functionalist viewpoint
presents a more accurate account of Nazi-era Germany because it creates an account that involves the
compliance – tacit or vocal approval – of the German people who participated in Nazi German
socially and politically. It is more likely though that the historiography of Fascism, as illustrated by
the Nazi presence in Germany, is not nearly as simplistic as it seems. A need exists to create a
synthesis between the approaches in order to understand exactly why Fascism is so complex, why it
was able to capture the support of so many people, and why it ultimately ended with such violence.
The current historiography depends upon these debates and has led to some very interesting and
enlightening conclusions, but it ultimately must move towards incorporating a synthesis of ideas to
understand Fascism and its evolution.
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Although not a geographically restricted movement, Fascism is certainly characterized by its
time-bound quality, experiencing its only real emergence in the period from the inter-war years to the
collapse of the Third Reich at the end of World War II. Fascist movements garnered support and
interest in many European countries outside of Germany and Italy, including France, Spain, Portugal,
Hungary, Romania, and Norway. The development of similar parties in Latin American countries
further illustrates the fact that Fascism is not determined by geographic qualities. 38 Though each
incorporated the same symbols and cultural qualities, it only tends to be remembered as European
because that is where it experienced the most success and led to the most violent destruction. Many
contemporary authoritarian regimes are often labeled “Fascist,” but this is generally a
misappropriation of the term.39
The ability to use this terminology correctly requires knowledge of the characteristics of
Fascism, the forces bringing it into existence, and the forms it took, especially in its most successful
structure. Fascism consists of more than simple authoritarianism or racism. To use only these
qualifications creates a definition so broad that it severely limits the ability to analyze the movement
fundamentally. Many authoritarian and/or racist regimes are acknowledged throughout history
without earning the title of Fascist. Something else beyond these terms must be incorporated into the
ideology of Fascism, placing understood limitations or conditions upon the term. Boundaries
separate Fascism from typical tyranny and dictatorship, and take into account the general desires of
the population at large. Although some arguments support the idea that these movements merely
38
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projected the powerful personalities of their leaders, too many similarities exist for their meteoric rise
to power to be coincidental. Large popular support for Italian Fascism and German Nazism as a
result of the unresolved issues and tensions created by World War I and modernity, combined with
German and Italian intellectual traditions best explains the success of Fascism and further illustrates
the reasons for its political success in Germany and Italy as opposed to other Fascist movement.
Many definitions of Fascisms offered thus far seem quite incomplete and based in ideology
rather than visible action. These definitions focus on the victimization and decline of a dominant
group in the face of a crisis and the need to reassert the primacy of the group under guidance of a
strong male authority who promotes closer integration of a purified community.40 While useful, this
approach lies more in the category of violent nationalism rather than Fascism as it lacks the element
of the nation-state as a religious entity. Some other designation based on action must be present to
elevate this ideological underpinning of Fascism if it is to be understood as a process that actively
seeks a following, alliances, and bids for power. Capitalizing on exercising this power encourages
popular participation and the redefinition of the state, a hallmark of Fascism, and was bolstered by
the use of propaganda. Fascism relies upon glorification of the state, racial purity, social Darwinism,
denigration of reason, exaltation of will, rejection of organized religion, and expansion of the state
through a program of war. These were part of the Nazi’s effort to create a political religion to fill a
secular void in society.
Fascism can accordingly be deemed violent nationalism driven by the totalitarian
implementation of a purely secular Kulturreligion.41 From this, it can be argued that Nazism was not
an entirely separate monster from Fascism, but rather a branch of the original ideology. Its intense
concentration on the deification of the Führer who represented the will of the nation differentiated it
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from the original Fascist form, as well as the creation of a single tangible demon in the form of the
Jewish ethnic minority. Overall, Fascism and Nazism deviated from each other only slightly and
leave the two ideologies with many commonalities, including the means they used to actualize their
programs.
Like any emerging ideology Fascism required, and relied upon, the presence of a gap in the
political spectrum, and like any successful ideology, it needed a raison d’être to mobilize the
population and attract people to its message. The situation on the continent following the end of
World War I provided Fascism with the opportunity to emerge and become successful. Germany’s
crushing defeat lead to economic disaster and, coupled with the rise of Bolshevism, created a
polarized political environment where the ability of the traditional authority to deal with change was
highly debatable. It is apparent that two models illustrate those opinions which negated the existing
Weimar government’s ability to deal with Germany’s – and other states’ - collapse. First to react
were the big-business industrialists and capitalists, the high-level model. Many feared Bolshevism
would spread throughout the continent in the wake of the 1917 revolution and topple an already
destabilized capitalist system. This fear drew the industrial middle-class into the Fascist party for
reasons of economic safety.42 Little evidence suggests these business leaders believed in the tenets of
Fascism, but rather it provided the only viable alternative to the growing communist/socialist threat.43
The second model comes from a low-level popular approach based on the voting patterns of
ordinary citizens, also focusing on their economic troubles during the depression, whether real or
perceived. The problems faced by all states following such a massive war left behind a social,
economic, and political structure ripe with discontent. The population viewed Fascist parties as a
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form of expression devoted to negating the experience of the war and its legacies. Again then,
whether or not the German population subscribed to all tenets of Fascist ideology in the inter-war
period, they viewed it as an acceptable alternative to the other political offerings at the time.
Programs offered by the Fascist leaders and their parties reflected all of these unresolved issues and
provided an outlet for an unsettled and dissatisfied population. These programs and promises were
much more than a projection of these forceful leaders’ personalities. Rather, these men represented
the physical embodiment of the ideals of the party and appeared to project the desires of the people.
In this way, Fascism became a synthesis of strong wills and strong opinion based on the desires of
the population which seemingly echoed those of the Fascist leadership.
Viewing Fascism from the benefit of the present provides hindsight surrounding the inherent
danger and destructive tendencies of such an ideology. Using such knowledge about the nature of
Fascism as it existed at its peak in the 1930s allows scholars and political leaders to understand the
movement more fully. Inevitably, questions concerning the ability of Fascism to possess a future and
play a role within the current political spectrum arise. Although several major European political
parties, organizations, and activists appear to contain all the trappings of Fascism, further
investigation exposes very little about these parties is truly Fascist.
The European origins of Fascism often give political observers and some academics cause for
concern that the birth-place of such a movement naturally remains predisposed to a resurgence of the
ideology. Critics of emerging far-right (or right-wing) parties often point out their anti-immigration
platforms as evidence of regression to the Fascist movement; these same critics are also quick to
illustrate the increasing violence between different nationalities on the continent. What fails to be
noted however, is that this violence plays more of a role at the individual level than the state level.
Right-wing parties of the modern political age, still facing repugnance and dark memories of the
World War II era, have been forced to adopt moderate-right stances on many issues in an effort to
gain wider public support and therefore cannot afford to create platforms based on racial violence.
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Even those parties which are very politically active, such as Italy’s MSI (Movimento Sociale
Italiano) and even Germany’s NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), remain fractured
and highly ineffectual. As a result they are regularly subjected to the political and social platforms of
mainstream party coalitions, preventing further radicalization and control.
Fascism though contains many more aspects than the violence and brutish nationalism that
new right-wing finds so appealing. These new groups and their leaders , Jean-Marie Le Pen in
France, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, Jörg Haider in Austria, all support liberty of the markets,
economic individualism, democratic institutions, and the rule of law.44 It seems as though the only
true connection between the modern radical right and Fascism is through the manipulation of
nationalism as it is connected to the state. Even here though, doubt exists as to how closely
connected they actually are. Fascism’s promotion of the state as a cultural container for the national
myth took place in an era before the advent of globalization and the general mobility of peoples.
Post-World War I Germany and Italy found themselves under a very different type of economic
duress than modern Europe. Nationalism then largely acted as a mechanism for finding a scapegoat
in the face of economic and cultural despair, as well as a call for rebuilding the valor of humiliated
peoples.
Historiographies of nationalism and Fascism in this respect are very much intertwined with
one another. Arguments regarding primordialism and modernism provide a strong basis for the
popularism versus instrumentalist argument behind the nature of Fascism. The characterization of
the German nation as primordial and organic feeds into the understanding of Fascism as a political
theory unable to exist or function without the popularist aspect, which in turn gives either
functionalism or intentionalism a stage on which to operate. The same holds true for a modernist and
instrumentalist connection, but the existing research clearly makes a more substantial case for
popular nationalism within German history.
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In many respects it is simple for the modernist to claim that the nation did not exist prior to
the birth of the modern era, due to the fact that the nation as experienced in this era certainly
possessed adaptations making its presence more relevant to the time period at hand. Importantly, the
nation undergoes many changes under the course of history rendering the connection between its premodern and modern forms unclear or seemingly absent. These continuities do exist though, as
illustrated by romantic intellectuals who strove to realize the pre-modern form of the German nation
in the modern era by articulating the internalized popular knowledge about the nation and
encouraging political involvement of the masses.
Ultimately the goal of Fascism and the Nazi party centered around the continuation of these
romantic ideals, seeing inter-war Germany as the true heir to the modern form of a German nation
corrupted early on by industrialization and business greed, alienating the working class. Again, the
Nazi party’s ability to complete this task required massive popular participation to determine the
direction of state policies. This practice of national inheritance makes for interesting predictions for
German society in the long-term contemporary era. Indeed, the ethnic nationalism which acted as an
identifier of the pre-modern era was embodied by the romantic nationalists and the Nazis, further
pushed into the modern era by coupling it with violence as a necessary means. Post-war state leaders
deeming Fascism an inappropriate political tool in the wake of a German “accident” merely
suppressed the ideology. It did not isolate these Romantic Nationalist ethnic values to the inter-war
and World War II period. The failure to address adequately Romantic Nationalism and its violent
aspects could be problematic in the post-modern era and this violent ethnic nationalism possesses the
possibility of re-emergence. New political ideologies can motivate the population to realize the
modern form of German romantic nationalism in a post-modern and post-industrial context,
especially if the people are denied the chance to engage in forms of popular self-critique.
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CHAPTER 3
ROMANTIC VALUES AND THE CHALLENGE OF LIBERALISM

Neither the instrumental nor the primordial arguments regarding the role of nationalism can
be fully understood without an evaluation of the emergence and composition of nationalism as an
ideological movement in the modern era. Though the French Revolution left many legacies in the
social and political spheres of Europe, none remains as virulent and relevant as the role nationalist
movements play in the construction of state interests and representation of the people. Though the
idea of the nation and the propagation of the national myth for political gain were firmly rooted in the
revolutionary struggle responsible for bringing France into the modern era, not until some thirty
years after the fact did these same tools become a European-wide phenomenon and one of the
hallmarks of the continent’s political traditions. In order to understand nationalism as an end result
of an independent ideological tradition, one must look to the period immediately following the
Napoleonic era of the French Revolution and the consequences left in its wake, each of which added
momentum to the growing fervor of nationalist movements.
From this domino effect it can also be inferred that the goal and philosophy behind
nationalism was to topple existing state structures and replace them with governments embodying
ideals regarding expanded political participation and the need for congruency between political and
cultural units.45 This goal effectively recognized the existence of a popularly understood culture, and
although best articulated by the intelligentsia, the entire process remained an anathema to the
instrumentalist argument as it acknowledges the pre-existing condition of a definable culture not
created by the state. Following Napoleon’s lengthy effort to widen and deepen French influence
across the continent, in 1815 European aristocrats ached for the re-establishment political control and
the promise of greater stability. The first response to this effort, and hence the first major legacy,
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was the settlement at the Congress of Vienna and the anciént regime concepts implemented by the
dominant political leaders to instrumentally curtail the idea of the nation. Ironically though, the
congress spawned a new radical movement on the domestic political scene with the rise of liberalism
and nationalism as an affront to the conservatism of authoritative monarchical rule and its adjuncts,
the nobility and church.
Immediately following the defeat of Napoleon in 1814, a conservative backlash occurred
across the continent in reaction to the French Revolution, which was the cause of instability and great
violence. The conservative leadership of Europe – monarchy, aristocracy, and clergy -shared the
viewpoint that liberalism remained a threat to their ability to maintain total control of the state and
society. Although their analysis for the failure of absolute monarchy in the face of radical liberalism
correctly articulated the core of the movement, their lack of foresight in allowing for the intertwining
of popular sovereignty and monarchy made the situation more politically dangerous than necessary.
The following year therefore saw representatives of the Quadruple Alliance – Russia, Prussia,
Austria, and Great Britain – converging upon Vienna in an effort to affirm their commitments to,
more or less, keeping France “in line” and preserving the status quo of continental powers.46
Outwardly, the system projected the use of concessions and compromises to maintain order, but this
practice was not reflected internally. On the domestic level these state leaders implemented ultraconservative policies aimed at controlling the population and maintaining absolute power.
Ultimately, an elaborate system of alliances and territorial shifts developed, creating an international
mechanism for maintaining peace and stability on the continent for the existing governments. At the
head of the system sat Austria’s Chancellor, Prince Clemens von Metternich, the architect behind the
Carlsbad Decrees and a model member of the political cosmopolitan elite, who consistently
identified himself an aristocrat first and Austrian in a close second. Metternich remained deeply
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loyal to and entrenched in the values provided by his social status and idealized pre-1789 Europe as a
picture of political effectiveness, fearing the liberalism sweeping across the continent, and believing
it to be responsible for the generation of war and suffering experienced.47
Metternich’s political fears remained the underlying common factor shared by all
representatives at the Congress of Vienna, whose eventual goals remained driven entirely by selfinterest and the conservation of the balance of power system operated by the political elite.48 These
members of the Quadruple Alliance intentionally initiated a treaty with France that possessed lenient
points and terms in an effort to reduce the risk of further inflaming the French liberals responsible for
disturbing the peace. Although this leniency greatly served the French intellectual and political
nationalist movement by saving it from complete repression, the treatment afforded to it in no way
mirrored the domestic policies of alliance members who prided themselves on the stability of
conservative regimes at home. The overall elitist nature of the Congress generated great tension on
the continent for although the powers felt satisfied, in intellectual and popular circles opinions ran
high that European politics remained a symbol of repression, disregarding the desires of the
population at large. In the German Confederation, these restrictions forced on the population
manifested themselves in the form of the 1819 Carlsbad Decrees. Aimed at curbing emerging liberal
student movements, the Decrees officially banned Burschenshaften (student associations), mandated
university inspections, and heavily censored the press. Local government reformers were forced out
of their positions, and by 1820 reform movements of any significance were wiped out of the political
spectrum.49
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Besides using domestic policy controls as a means for maintaining the balance of power, members of
the Quadruple Alliance also incorporated territorial redistribution into its program, punishing the
offending state of France by shrinking its sovereign territory. Maps of the continent after the
dissolution of the Congress illustrate the striking feature that territorial shifts such as the
incorporation of lands on the French eastern boundary into Prussia did not take into consideration the
local populations and their nationalities. These actions of arbitrarily dividing and creating national
allegiances foreshadowed the large role of nationalism in European politics in the coming decades.50
Boundaries to states may change, but this does not change sentiment of the nation that they
incorporate, even after long periods of time. Historical evidence and contemporary studies both reenforce the theories that interaction and shared history promote nationalism rather than political
boundaries.
The conservative international response to liberalism in politics tended to mask the disorder
occurring on the domestic scene. At the time, each state experienced the effects of dual revolution,
comprised of economic and political components, intertwined and further emphasizing the rift
between conservative and liberal ideologies. While the aristocracy tended to dominate all branches
of politics, the middle classes showed a growing interest and desire for participation in domestic
affairs. As the middle class accumulated an unprecedented amount of wealth and success, the
growing economic power of entrepreneurs and factory owners drove their desire for greater political
involvement as well. These men found themselves drawn to liberal politics and the pressure for the
inception of a more representative form of government as their wealth made them highly susceptible
to and affected by economic legislation enforced by the monarchy. Greater incentive therefore
existed to instill a desire to participate politically, which slowly dispersed to the lower middle class
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Figure 3.1. Europe in 1815 and 1871 – The Congress of Vienna and later German unification
succeeded in re-drawing the boundaries and territory of several German states and principalities.
This action increased the number of peoples able to consider themselves “German,” while
disregarding language and ethnic barriers.
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and led to the monarchy’s response through the use of mechanisms of repression such as the
Carlsbad decrees.
By 1848, reactionary activity and intellectual articulation of popular political needs
culminated in a series of revolutions across the continent, driven forward by liberal dedication to
popular sovereignty.51 Numerous foundational documents and manifestos emerged prior to the
onslaught of the revolutionary tide, each espousing views regarding the role of the nation and all
rooted themselves in the cultural history of many peoples looking to validate political participation
on the basis of their origins. These interpretations of history connected strongly to the writers and
revolutionaries of the Romantic era who agitated for greater political strength for the nation. The
revolutions of 1848 in Austria and Prussia – with the German states - were only the first in the series
of events that made use of large scale nationalism inspired by idealistic demands for greater liberties
within Germany. Following the actions of the French population in Paris earlier in the year, German
workers, students, and members of the middle-class led revolts on the streets of Berlin and Vienna in
an effort to force their absolutist monarchs to abdicate the throne. Citizens of both Austria and
Prussia yearned for increases to their civil liberties and restrictions on the nobility in order to bolster
their political power as citizen members of the nation and – under Romantic Nationalist ideology –
leaders of the state.
The threat of overwhelming violence and complete loss of control forced Emperor Ferdinand
and Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm IV to make concessions in accordance with the revolutionaries’
demands. In the face of such rapid success, the liberal revolutionaries celebrated the success of the
Romantic Nationalist ideology which appeared to fulfill its promises of state existence for the benefit
of autonomous nations. Such celebrations, however, swiftly proved to be hasty. Once the revolution
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ceased and the political work initiated, the liberal and nationalistic coalitions rapidly splintered. In
Austria and Prussia, economic, social, and ethnic differences proved too incongruous to create any
political consensus. Debates over representation and constitutional content generated frustration and
suspicion among the assembly delegates, leading to a cleavage in the once-unified liberal front.
During these revolutions of 1848 Austria faced greater challenges from nationalism and
Prussia faced greater challenges from liberalism. As an empire encompassing many nationalities, the
Austrian delegates found it difficult to reconcile their liberal success with the failure of autonomy for
each ethnic national group. For the Hungarians and Czechs, this autonomy always proved to be the
largest sticking point, and their large presence in the empire forced the Emperor to accept their
demands for greater representation and control over domestic matters. Though these gains served the
Hungarian and Czech cause, the German group resented the gains made without. Constant bickering
between political groups made it nearly impossible for the delegation to properly represent the
masses and control the Austrian nobility. Fighting became increasing fierce until physical violence
broke out between the Czechs and Germans in Vienna, which allowed the Emperor’s military to
regain control of the city, at which point Ferdinand reasserted his authority and annulled all previous
concessions.52
The political situation in Prussia at the time followed a nearly identical trajectory, except
liberal in-fighting, rather than ethnic, destroyed the popular coalition. The unity of political purpose
that held the Germans together began to break down during the Großdeutsch/Kleindeutsch debate
about whether Austria should play a role in the new Germany. The former provided Austria and
members of the nobility with a role in German politics while the latter isolated Austria and restricted
the role of the nobility. The new Parliament did eventually agree upon the Kleindeutsch solution, but
not before the ideological differences between liberal factions became clearly evident; a situation
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exacerbated by the disputes over the issue of popular representation in the constitution. Classical
liberals adopted a moderate stance on political change and found the Kaiser’s restrained concessions
agreeable while the radical liberals agitated for complete concessions and forms of republican and
democratic representation in the government. Rather than attack the royal prerogative, both parties
assailed each other and without a unified front, it proved impossible to impose any popular will upon
the stubborn king.53 Before long, political blows turned physical and Wilhelm handily regained
control of his government in a style similar to Ferdinand.
These failures of 1848 left a lasting impression on German Romantic Nationalists, especially
the radicals who hoped to push the revolution to a more extreme conclusion in the near future.
Consequently, the Romantic Nationalist movement became increasingly radical as the moderate
element was pushed out in favor of a more extreme version of nationalism. The form of Romantic
Nationalism that characterized the second half of the nineteenth century viewed the 1848 revolutions
as a failure of less radical Romantic Nationalism. This was an indictment of moderate liberal ideals
and their lack of conviction in the ability and strength of the nation. 1848 was Romantic Nationalism
with shared forms of ethnicity, but it lacked the necessary force to succeed because there was not true
solidarity and the continued existence of right-wing repression tore the foundational ideology of the
movement.
For German Romantic Nationalists then, the only recourse of action was to become more
radical in ideology and action. Over the next two decades, shared language, culture, and blood
became hallmarks of the true nation. The increased prospects of German unification gave the
Romantic Nationalists hope of actualizing nationalism to create a sovereign ethnic space, providing
true popular sovereignty and power to the genetically superior Germans. The state-building efforts
of Otto von Bismarck only appeared further articulated the nationalistic mythos by combining race,
geography, and citizenship. The unification of Germany in 1871 was not – according the Romantic
53

Gordon A. Craig, Europe, 1815-1914, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Holt, Rheinhart, and Winston, Inc., 1971), 135.

47

Nationalist ideology – successful. Though Bismarck did believe in the inherent superiority of some
members of society, those beliefs were colored by Burke’s classical conservatism rather than a liberal
philosophy. Superiority for Bismarck originated not with genetics, but instead elitism and moneyed
interests better prepared an individual to qualify for leadership positions in society.54 Bismarck’s
goal was to create a powerful central state where the elite or moneyed classes could dominate not just
German, but European politics and society because they were prepared for that task. This German
unification occurred without regard for ethnic nationalist interests created a conglomerate state of
several nationalities, ethnicities, and cultures. The official policy such as Kulturkampf attempted to
instill a sense of cultural uniformity upon the state, but ignored the issue of ethnicity and race that
increasingly the Romantic Nationalist movement used to define German identity.55 For these ardent
ethnic nationalists, the nation-state remained an unrealized goal with no extant representation or
example of an ideal Germany.
Over the course of political evolution in the nineteenth century, the emergence of the
Romantic Movement as the dominant ideology in art and literature drew the radical intelligentsia,
and others, to move away from focusing on concrete representations of daily life. Rather, these
thinkers stressed the abstract representation of ideology that portrayed in an idealized and nonexistent past. Emphasis shifted to vivid use of the imagination and a desire to recalculate drastically
the course of society on a model of how it ought to operate, especially in terms utilized by this new
class of intelligentsia. Radical liberal thought combined with this new intellectual movement to give
rise to the ideology of nationalism as a means for incorporating a larger cross-section of the
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population into the political sphere, fostering a desire for greater public participation and
dissatisfaction with the current regime.
This economic and social transformation fueled the intellectual challenge to both liberalism
and conservatism though each answered the challenge with different forms of political and social
rhetoric. Certainly, liberalism and nationalism are not the same beast. They are intertwined, but not
equal, and one does not create the other. In fact, classical liberals and conservatives both feared
nationalist masses and the idea of popular sovereignty. The principle hallmarks of conservatism are
absolute monarchy, government involvement in the economy, social stability, and supporting the role
of established religion. Conservatism then maintains the overall appearance and quality of a highly
reactionary program designed to maintain the status quo. Classical liberalism’s characteristics
include the desire for limited monarchy, a laissez-faire economic program, the rule of law, and
recognizing needs for essential reform. Liberalism represented a truly revolutionary change in both
government sovereignty and practice and its followers deeply rejected conservatism. Radical
intellectuals and middle class adherents equated liberalism with liberty and equality, focusing on the
incorporation of popular sovereignty into mainstream politics and pushing the boundaries regarding
notions of government.56 Baron Charles de Montesquieu’s theory proposing the necessary separation
of powers, as compatible with the classic liberal ideology of constitutional monarchy, remains only
one such example of the anti-absolutist sentiments growing among the intelligentsia.57 Liberalism in
its classic form, however, still continued the tradition of attaching qualifications of property
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ownership to voting rights, limiting the idea of citizenship.58 In response, development of more
radical forms of liberalism sprung up across the continent, including democratic and republican
variants.
Not surprisingly then, this same environment which allowed for the birth of radical liberalism
also fostered the age of nationalism. Taking its cue from the political sphere, nationalist movements
drew from the notion of individual rights, which developed into the notion that national aspirations
for liberty, self-determination, and basic freedoms paralleled those of individuals. Since all members
of the nation automatically retained citizen status in a cultural capacity, if the nation determined its
own affairs politically then all would participate since their citizenship already existed. Hence being
a part of the nation meant participating in affairs of the state.59 The idea behind nationalism
resonated throughout the war-weary intellectual community as a means for achieving peace and
stability on the continent, rather than the conservative method of instrumentally implemented and
carefully orchestrated alliances. Popular desires for liberty and free nations provided the only basis
for true freedom as the achievement of nationalism eliminated mechanisms for cultural oppression.
This era in European history presented the perfect opportunity and timing for the
implementation of nationalism, giving it an almost explosive character. Rapid industrialization and
urbanization led to standards of language and communication between peoples, while symbols and
ceremonies were used to create imagined communities.60 Perceived commonalities between large
numbers of strangers in these instances create connections based on components arising from
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antiquity, and the nation simply represents these antiques relationships in a more modern and
tangible way. Nationalism depends upon the fact that people believe they share a common history,
culture, or language.
Concepts of the nation as an entity though remained notoriously vague and many grappled
with largely abstract theoretical arguments. Prior to the outbreak of the French Revolution and the
onset of the Romantic Movement, intellectuals and philosophers wrestled with ideas of the nation,
citizenship, and the role of the state in political affairs. These foundational documents created the
basis for articulating the beliefs and needs of the middle classes and the population in general. The
answers formulated in regards to these debates mentioned above largely set the standard for
characterizing the traits of the nation.
Intellectuals studied a variety of states across Europe during different revolutionary periods
though their writings generated a common message regarding the concept of nationalism. Inciting
the internal desires in men for the good of their brethren, authors such as Abbe Sieyès, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, and Giuseppe Mazzini all pressed for members of the nation excluded politically to band
together as the single national unit they represented and force change upon the government. These
intellectuals used public manifestos to push for political and cultural congruency upon an already
existing nation, knowing that any such action must be called out at the popular level.
Rousseau recognized this capacity for providing stability by the general population when he
put forth his recommendation for moving Poland away from the anarchy which threatened the state
both internally and externally. For strength Poland required national institutions and nationalist zeal
to speak to the hearts of the Poles.61 Such anarchy exited because the Poles saw no reflection of
themselves, as a nation, in the state and so pushed for movement away from the existing government.
Only a natural republic based on a single nation could save Poland from vicious internal divisions.
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Rousseau asserts that where love of fatherland prevails, Poles will “serve it zealously and with all
their hearts because even bad legislation produces good citizens”.62 The argument here refers to the
fact that once allowed to achieve nationalist aims, the people only have themselves to blame in the
face of a poorly functioning state, preventing massive revolutionary upheaval and encouraging
stability on the continent.
In the months leading up the French Revolution, Sieyès rallied popular sentiments for
national unification. Sieyès poses and answers the question, “what is the third estate?” He concludes
the third estate, synonymous with the public and people, are everything.63 The nation drives society
and provides for the needs of all, including the nobility who are the parasites of society. The masses,
therefore, deserve to control their political futures but this is only possible if they unite as a nation to
implement their cause and take control of the state from the aristocracy.
Similarly, the movement for Italian unification prompted parallel proposals for transferring
state control to the nation, this time in a forceful manner by the actions of the people. Keeping with
the tradition of the peasants and working men at the heart of the nation, Mazzini pleaded to these
specific groups that acting for the good of the nation lay not only in their best interests, but as
members of the nation such actions were in fact their duty. Thus for Mazzini, ensuring the rights of
all citizens by submitting fully to the nation and not infringing upon the rights of others remains the
only way to improve the condition of the people.64 Recognition of rights relating to “individual
liberties becomes useless unless a means for exercising them are provided.”65 Nationalism provides
an outlet for these rights while simultaneously enforcing the duty to uphold the rights of fellow men
in the interests of the nation. Mazzini’s writing formally introduced the process of intertwining the
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nation and citizenship by incorporating the notion of rights and duty as they apply to the nationalist
aims driving Italian unification.
Historian Jules Michelet also examined the evolution of the role of the masses in European
history, as society transformed from agrarian to industrial. Writing about the French Revolution
some 50 years after its occurrence, Michelet credited the event to the misery of the masses, the
lower-class peasants and workers of society, and petit bourgeoisie. These individuals felt
marginalized and abused by the middle and upper-classes, left behind in the process of
industrialization and the onslaught of modernity. According the Michelet, modernization and
industrialization heightened conflict between political and ideological discourse and the masses are
swallowed by the wealthy business owners and aristocracy in the process.66 Michelet called for the
masses to recognize and act upon their love of country to solve France’s problems. It is again, the
task of the humble nation comprised of inherently good masses to renew and provide for the progress
of the state.
Those who provide for the nation represent the nation since the entity is, according to Ernest
Renan who wrote in 1882, “the fruit of a long past spent in toil, sacrifice, and devotion.”67 The
people built the nation with their dedication and sacrifice and are entitled to control the political
institutions of the state. The existence of the nation is a daily plebiscite, and it is the right of its
inhabitants to be consulted in matters of the state.68 Unlike many of his counterparts, Renan’s
conception of the nation is not based upon race, but a community that shares common characteristics.
Renan wrote his discourse on the nation in an effort to counter the developing race-based German
form of Roman Nationalism, though he continued a tradition of rebuffing the privileged role of the
aristocracy.
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Nationalism, romanticism, and liberalism all combined to contradict conservatism in a scope
broader than simply politics. This synthesis gained momentum and popularity across the continent
after the onset of the French Revolution. Political instability during this time period created gaps in
the political spectrum capable of generating support for radical new forms of thought and increasing
their availability and the chance for widespread dissemination. Classified especially as a revolt
against classicism and the enlightenment, romantic artists found their muse in the new political
ideologies. No more did the shackles of rationality and restraint hold back the artist. Liberal
intellectuals deeply influenced artists with their ideas of the individual and sources of unique
potential. Painters and authors no longer worked to produce representations of reality as they could
now produce possibilities for reality in the future, and in turn re-create idealized versions of the past.
Similarly, nature became a hallowed source of spiritual inspiration instead of the pantheon of
science, evoking a strong sense of pastoralism and the knowledge that peasants and workers of the
land represented the most pure form of the nation, untainted by modernity and excess. Romantic art
reflects this creative wonder beautifully, embracing emotional exuberance and unrestrained
imagination as illustrated in such paintings as “Wanderer above the Sea of Fog” by German artist
Caspar David Friedrich.69 Friedrich’s work embodies the wild and unrestrained brush strokes used to
depict the human spiritual connection to unspoiled scenes of nature, and the country provides a
source of inspiration that contradicts the ugly economic and political despair of modern society. Art
and literature of this variety allow perfectly the type of usage which reminds individuals of their
heritage and past, bringing antique qualities of nations to the forefront of their culture. An excellent
example of this process is provided by the Brothers Grimm and their “rescue” and revival of German
fairy tales for reincorporation into modern society.70 Not only did the Brothers Grimm recast old
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folk tales in a context which provided modern sensibilities and lessons, but more often they actually
constructed new epics of German folklore as if they were old, creating a past that never existed and
yet convincing the public they had a right to connect with and control that same imagined history.
The effect of this movement upon society was monumental. In the wake of economic and
political transformation, radical liberal interpretations of the upheaval collided with the rise of the
Romantic Movement. This synthesis evolved to generate romantic nationalism, the form of
nationalism that dominated the first half of nineteenth-century Europe. By the second half of the
century though, Romantic nationalism increasingly incorporated more radical forms of liberalism in
reaction against the modern world. The ideology attached and abused by the Nazi movement of the
twentieth century relates directly to this virulent strain of romanticism where the excesses of the
modern world were inexplicably tied to the expansion of industrialism. This concept of society
ultimately provided Romantic nationalist adherents with a specific worldview guiding the
relationship between the race-based nation and the state, especially in Germany.
Romantic nationalist ideology depicts the state as an entity which derives its political
legitimacy as an organic consequence of the unity of those it governs; pertaining to its four very
important characteristics. First, it operates as a constructive force, with its goal being to solidify the
state in such a way that it incorporates all members of the nation and allows for their full political
participation. Next, it maintains the force of a popular movement. The idea of legitimacy in the
creation of the state automatically implies that this nationalism comes from below to influence a
government reflective of the population’s national identity.
Thirdly, because of romantic nationalism’s popular roots it will always entail the use of a
process where an end goal exists. During this process, the cultural majority becomes the political
majority over a given period of time, employing the use of violence if necessary to implement
Grimm” National Geographic, 1999, http://www.nationalgeographic.com/grimm/article.html (accessed 14April
2008). Jack Zipes. The Brothers Grimm: From Enchanted Forests to the Modern World (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2002).
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Figure 3.2. “Wanderer above the Sea of Fog,” (1818) – Caspar David Friedrich’s painting perfectly
represents the style of romantic landscape painting, with imaginative brushstrokes and a wild, ideal,
and untamed earth. Hailed as the ultimate German Romanticist, Friedrich’s reputation as an artist
suffered during the post-war period, when his works were associated with the German nationalism of
the Nazis.
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national popular sovereignty. Finally, the character of Romantic nationalism rests upon the idea of
primordialism. This sense of long-forged unity calls on people to defend their natural cultural
character based on the existence of national myths and the bond of common language. This premodern evocation of blood, ethnicity, and language all combined to form a single political signifier
used previously in European history, such as the Frankish movement into Saxony in 779 and the
Statutes of Kilkenny passed against the Irish by the English in 1367.71 It is, however, the
combination of these characteristics that differentiates romantic nationalism as a cultural force potent
enough to provide competition for the excesses and materialism of the modern era associated with
radical forms of liberalism.
This is not to say however, that romantic nationalism did not face ideological and practical
roadblocks in its implementation. Language as a political signifier often provided the most
complicated – and problematic - method for creating a nation and constructing a state upon such an
identity. Interestingly, a map of Europe in 1815 after the Congress of Vienna appears to possess,
with the exception of the German and Italian federations, quite a congruous landscape with states
covering large amounts of geographic areas.72 By overlaying a language map over this landscape, it
becomes very clear that even traditional states were very divided internally by several languages and
local patois.73 Here, the picture becomes so fractured that the use of language would, in essence, tear
states apart and contradict the idea of romantic nationalism as a constructive force. Although
language may therefore be used to evoke sentiment and emotion, as an identifier of the nation it
remains singularly ineffective. Language’s general lack of cohesiveness makes the roles of national
myth, imagined communities, and tools of disassociation all the more important to nationalist
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Figure 3.3. Map of Central and Western Europe, 1815 – The Congress of Vienna also re-drew and
consolidated the boundaries of all states in Western and Central Europe. All states involved
contained peoples of many ethnicities and languages, creating civil tension and difficulty in creating
and implementing the national myth.

Figure 3.4. Language Families and Dialects of Europe – The fractured and localized language
communities within – and often crossing – state boundaries prevents the creation of national myths
and nationalism based on common language. This leads to invocations of common history, lineage,
and symbolism.
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movements – very fractured populations need to believe they possess deep commonalities even if not
founded on anything as tangible as a shared language.
Romantic art in many cases acted a propaganda tool for the dissemination of nationalist ideas
to the broader public. Artists ably transformed liberal ideas written in manifestos into strong
symbolism and pictures for the broader public to easily access and participate in such intellectual
debates, giving it a didactic quality similar to Christian art. Eugene Delacroix’s “Liberty Leading the
People” is an immediate example of such art created as propaganda for consumption by the general
public.74 With his wild, emotive brushstrokes, Delacroix depicted lady liberty in the foreground,
bare-breasted and brandishing the tricolor and leading the French as a mother figure. Alongside her
stand men of mixed social classes, bearing arms and fighting side by side in the street; a myth which
never reflected reality as neither group actually fought. In the background Notre Dame appears to
burn in a furious blaze symbolizing the destruction of the old conservative regime, closely tied to the
church.
1848 also provided an impetus for the creation of German Revolutionary Art created in the
Romantic style. Philipp Veit’s “Germania” is perhaps the most widely recognized work in this
genre.75 Though at first sight rather plain, this simplicity actually defines the purpose of Veit’s
artwork and betrays his study in the Nazarene movement and the bold colors indicate his early fresco
training. This simplicity serves to embody the honesty and spirituality in the painting. These
objectives are achieved as the artist forgoes the use of layered symbolism, the singularity of the
figure, and bold consistent use of the German colors. Undoubtedly Delacroix also influenced Veit
with his allegorical female figure since Veit also uses a female image to represent a strong, nurturing
Germany, though his Christian roots likely explain the increased modesty. Revolutionary art like
“Germania” ably crossed socio-economic divides to more easily promote nationalist sentiments.
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In other cases of fractured language and national boundaries, many authors in the Romantic
Movement often turned to ideas of ethnicity and race, incorporating the ideology of Social
Darwinism that emerged in the 1860s. These intellectuals expressed an influence from new scientific
ideas in their work and looked to the natural world to explain better the structure of society and how
it functioned. Emerging scientists combined ideas about social hierarchy with pseudo-scientific
infantilizing methods such as phrenology that evolved and were later employed in the imperial
colonies.
Importantly, conceptualizations of Social Darwinism evolved based on the idea that people
fall into social hierarchy because of their own failures, along with observations about the nature of
human relationships from the imperializing world. Darwinism possessed two strains: domestic and
racial. Domestic Social Darwinism is the more benign of the two models and supports the classical
liberal views of society where all have an equal chance, but not all will succeed. Racial Social
Darwinism gained momentum in the late nineteenth century exploited and popularized by the
Romantic nationalist movement. Many proponents believed that within society existed peoples of
separate genetic composition which made them inherently inferior and destined to be trapped
somewhere between man and beast. Even though the science behind this idea greatly bastardized the
work of Charles Darwin and others, notions of “survival of the fittest” remained very socially
popular and their incorporation into intellectual works about the nation fostered stronger myths
regarding the destiny of genetically chosen individuals. The discovery of genetics did not dispel the
pseudo-science behind racial superiority theories, but rather served to enhance and seemingly verify
the existing literature.
The German theorist most associated with incorporating racial social Darwinism is Heinrich
von Treitschke, who dominated intellectual discussions regarding competition among races in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. Treitschke fully believed in the assertion of racial power
through the practices of imperialism and that a nation could only prove its virility by dominating a
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Figure 3.5. “Liberty Leading the People,” (1830) – Regarded as the ultimate propaganda in art
during the Revolutionary Era, Eugène Delacroix’s painting remains vital for understanding
nationalism in art. Emotional images like these played a crucial role in disseminating and reinforcing
the national myth for a wide audience.

Figure 3.6. “Germania,” (1848) – Philipp Veit took capitalized on German nationalist sentiment
during the Revolutions of 1848 by depicting the nation as a women with external strength and power
to protect, but internally possessing the ability to nurture.
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barbarian state. Certain nations were inherently weaker than others because of genetic
predispositions and the strong, if assertive and advantageous, would play a dominant in the social
hierarchy. National identity, according the Treitschke, is determined by these racial (genetic)
characteristics, and the term “nationality” is used to convey the idea of common blood. The
consciousness of this nationality, or common blood, was aroused as a reaction to the repressive
Napoleonic era and culminated in the “attainment of political unity.”76 Undoubtedly, the eventual
success of revolution and unification in Germany only fueled Treitschke’s message of Germanic
racial superiority. His belief in the special nature of the German race – Hegelian influence - shows in
the proclaimed superiority of its cosmopolitan spirit, natural physical strength, and the indebtedness
of other nations to the German spirit of inventiveness.
Although grand in scope, the fact remains that the German revolution of 1848 was quite
unsuccessful. The real challenge to power on the continent did not take form until the 1860s and
‘70s with the unifications of Italy and Germany, respectively. Even though these two unifications
made use of nationalism, the governments born out of them still relied on the use of conservative
tactics to maintain the balance of power structure between state governments. The many secret
treaties formulated during this period, such as the triple alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary,
and Russia, were indicative of the aristocracy’s fear of losing power. Each treaty reassured state
leaders of an ally in the fight against revolution at home and abroad, though the reliance upon and
collapse of these alliances ultimately led the continent into The Great War at the beginning of the
twentieth century. These diplomatic failures further cemented in the mind of nationalists that only
governments led by the people could alleviate the causes of war, suffering, and rebuild the dignity of
peoples.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NATIONAL RACE: BUILDING AN IDEAL GERMANY

While social Darwinism found a niche in the theoretical writings on nationalism by German
authors, for the most part these authors represented a minority opinion during the nineteenth century.
It appears that these theorists experienced marginalization from the mainstream nationalist movement
for their promotion of such radical ideas. More popularly, the intellectual community supported ideas
about the state as a derivative of popular national sovereignty rooted in the classic liberal notions of
rights and liberty.77 The emergence of Fascism after World War I however, set in motion a series of
changes in the composition of nationalism which generated a dangerous break from precedent.
Increasingly, Fascist regimes – specifically Nazi Germany in this case – focused on the use of
biology and desire for racial purity as a tool for inciting the traditional hallmarks of Romantic
Nationalism, such as popular participation, the necessary use of violence, and primordialism.
Nationalism in its inter-war form allows for congruency between the cultural and political units by
taking the basic tenets of Romantic Nationalism and giving the ideology racial “roots”. Race
arguably makes culture easier to define by eliminating external factors and creating a simplistic
common denominator for establishing a single cultural unit.
National Socialist propaganda masterfully rose to this challenge by emphasizing the cultural
and economic dissatisfaction and fear extant in the wake of the Great War. Hitler’s willing audience
accepted the declared existence of enemies to the state both internationally and domestically as it
reinforced popular fears and political participation at the local level by solidifying and making the
“other” a tangible entity. The Nazi program encompassed the pseudo-scientific theories espoused by
German intellectuals in the prior century, individuals previously marginalized and who had
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experienced little influence domestically. The Nazi leadership then merely capitalized upon
popularly held beliefs articulated for the general population by German intelligentsia during the
previous revolutionary and state-building periods. Nazi leaders implemented these beliefs as state
ideology, but they did not necessarily create them or need to exert an undo amount of persuasion
upon all sections of the populace, German history.
Accordingly, voting patterns and the National Sozialistische Deutche Arbeiters Partei
(NSDAP)’s concentration of power underscores the necessity of popular participation and the
incorporation of ideals regarding racial and biological superiority prior to the Fascist era. The Nazi
leadership continued to propagate Romantic Nationalist philosophies regarding the nature of the
nation and state, but also ensured the continuation of national identity’s popularism by exploiting the
German fear of outsiders and further using public support to implement theories of racial purity as
practice. Monopolized and originally implemented by Nazi leadership, the end intent to eliminate
“others” found its means and vehicle in popular nationalism. Although Nazi rhetoric and the party
platform originally indicated the necessary elimination of all non-German peoples, the process
evolved functionally beginning with the Jewish question and reached its final means by either the
vocal or tacit approval from the populace at large.78 This consolidation of power by the Nazi party
was characterized by long-term planning and intense campaigning, especially at the local level for
the purposes of convincing the German people that the Nazi program was best suited for carrying out
these Romantic Nationalist ideals.79 Through the formation and infiltration of small local clubs, Nazi
officials beginning in the 1930s conceived a platform for implementing the ideas driving the German
ideology of the nineteenth century.
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From the end of World War I until the 1933 election, local Nazis used wartime humiliation
and economic turmoil to paint a portrait of an internal enemy responsible for destroying the vitality
of the German people. This rhetoric resonated with cultural criticisms made by German intellectuals
against the state regarding the nation’s ability of create a strong state, and the destructive capacity of
outsiders, effectively capitalizing on fears and myths already long in existence at the local level.
Most famously, in the interwar period all segments of society largely accepted the Dolchstoß legend
as an explanation for recent German historical events, blaming the disaster of World War I on the
lack of action on the part of the ethnically German public to fulfill their duty to the nation, essentially
producing feelings of shame and failure. This nativist inaction however, did not comprise the
primary component of this myth. Rather, its proponents targeted internal scapegoats composed of
“others” and their sympathizers whose actions during the war betrayed the community and prevented
“true” Germans from supporting the war effort. 80 Ultimately, the Nazis further capitalized upon
popular and historical myths by specifically indicting the Jewish race as the party responsible for the
troubles of Germany and the public’s inability to perform its national duties.
Though an argument can be made for “isolating the influence of Anti-Semitism” as the sole
rationale for Holocaust activities, it appears that these racial prejudices mostly reflect a projection of
this failure by the German popular majority upon ethnic and political minorities.81 Beyond the
reincarnation of the scapegoat however, the party simultaneously fed into popular myths of national
cultural and physical superiority, generating public support for National Socialism and turning their
proposition for the return to pure German nationalism into a viable political option.82
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The Nazi party did not offer a program breathtakingly novel to the population. What they
effectively accomplished, however, was the re-introduction of these ideas to those alienated during
the Great War, bridging the generation gap of cultural criticism, a tradition of blaming the current
state leadership and internal enemies for the decline of the nation. By re-introducing such ideas, the
Nazi party transferred the dissatisfaction with government and modernity originating with the
generations under Wilhelm II to the generation coming of age in the wake of the Great War. In doing
so, they provided their followers with the ability to embody this paradox of “seeking to destroy the
despised present in order to recapture an idealized past in an imaginary future.”83 To do so, the Nazis
relied on the writings of cultural critics discontented with modern society who systematically
attacked the liberal tradition of the Enlightenment, denigrated reason, blatantly spouted antiSemitism, and finally denied the ability of the modern state and its version of culture to nourish the
souls of its people. The condition of post-World War I Germany provided suitable circumstances for
the resurrection of corrupted Romantic ideals, and the National Socialists spent little time
indoctrinating the population and expended most of their energy reinforcing popular German
sentiments by further articulating already well-ingrained, centuries-old prejudices. Upon the political
implementation of National Socialism by public vote a Fascist state emerged – with the populous
fully aware of the implications of their voting behavior. This does not necessarily mean that any
right wing party would have established Fascism or that the German people chose the Nazis because
of the party’s Fascist tendencies. As previously discussed regarding the definitions of Fascism
provided by Robert Paxton and George Mosse, Fascism is a political variation which can be
distinguished from other right-wing organizations. Both authors might indicate an existence of
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proto-fascist characteristics in German Romantic Nationalism that the Nazis adopted and fully
articulated with ease, thus stressing the overt reliance on existing popular sentiments.
Fascism then, even at its height of political maturity, is defined as a form of political behavior
where general preoccupation with the national community drives the nationally committed masses
(Volk) to abandon democratic liberties and pursues redemptive violence.84 This definition directly
utilizes the principle of popularism as it invokes a spirit of the nation and precariously places control
and direction of the state in the nation’s hands. One can deduce from popular participation and
voting patterns that National Socialism was viewed to be the manifestation of the nation, a
manifestation in which Fascism represented the congruency between the nation and the state. Key to
the manifestation of national sentiment, again, lay in the ability of local Nazi officials to articulate
and resonate public feeling, mirroring understanding of the meaning of being “German.” Nazi
leadership, using popular dissatisfaction and the national myth, ultimately created a symbiosis
between party leadership and the Volk in their articulation of public sentiment.
Nazi rhetoric echoed sentiments of the national theorists in its denunciation of Romantic
Nationalism as infiltrated and subverted by liberalism, a liberalism associated with the Jews. This
seditious activity – by Jews and Liberals – was responsible, according to the rhetoric, for the
destruction of “German” morals and Kultur. One of these earliest influences is found in Johann
Gottlieb Fichte, who is considered to be the father of German nationalism and later inspired Hegel.
Fichte’s original philosophical insights revolved around concepts regarding self-consciousness and
self-awareness. Living in an era in which the intelligentsia focused on crises of national identity and
participation doubtlessly influenced the way in which Fichte utilized his own philosophical theories.
Foundation documents urging mass participation in politics based on common history and nation
connection certainly influenced Fichte’s ability to begin conceptualizing the self-awareness of the
nation as a social phenomenon.
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As a result, Fichte turned to the field of political philosophy were he attempted to address the
German nation and attempt to provide a definition for German identity. These early works not only
attempted nation definition, but did so at the expense of ethnic minorities, especially the Jews. In
1793’s Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums, Fichte plainly illustrated his distaste for
the presence of Jews in Germany by referring to them as “a state within a state” capable of
“undermining” the German nation.85 He went on further to explain that the only possible way for
Jews to obtain civil rights would be if “all of their heads were cut off and replaced with new ones
devoid of all Jewish thoughts.”86
Such explicit anti-Semitism was conspicuously absent from Fichte’s most popular work on
the nation, Reden an die deutsche Nation (1806), delivered before a crowd in French occupied
Berlin. Fichte’s intent was to inspire the Germans by unequivocally defining the nation in tangible
terms of language and culture. It can be argued though that this scholarly attempt collapsed into
subjective diatribes concerning ethnic nationalism and was most likely mediated. Arguably, Fichte
intended maintain a façade of neutrality and inclusiveness, but his markers for nationality had no
choice but to devolve because of their inability to secure the immortality that ultimately provides
motivation for the nation’s existence; only ethnicity can provide this immortality.87
The writings of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel exhibit such traits and his Der Philosophie
des Rechts (1821) remained devoted to explaining history through the current world order and the
virtues of the strongest races in the world, based on success and failures of the past. Broken into four
groups, the German Race comprised one of the nations destined to lead the world as their national
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philosophy gave them moral superiority over lesser nations.88 Hegelian interpretations of history and
the impending future regarding certain peoples however, manifest themselves clearly in elements of
Hitler’s foreign policy program, including the desire for lebensraum and alliances with Italy and
Japan, as well as the existence of a (believed unfulfilled) German realm as an epoch of world
history.89
Influenced by Hegel’s proto-biological dominance theory, the National Socialist
Weltanschauung pulled elements from the writings of other German intellectual theorists frustrated
by the political and cultural situation of the modern German state who also focused on elements of
race. Paul Anton de Lagarde’s Deutsche Schriften (1878-81), Arther Möller van den Bruck’s Das
Dritte Reich (1923), and Julius Langbehn’s Rembrandt als Erzieher (1890) are three prominent
examples of the intellectual theories culled by Nazi party leaders. These nationalists attacked modern
culture by indicting the population’s complacency with liberalism and allowing it to minimize and
destroy the culture of Germany. Many of these thinkers viewed the failure of the revolution of 1848
as a fault of modernity, whereby liberalism and the will of the state took precedent over the Romantic
Nationalism responsible for unifying culture and generating political success elsewhere on the
continent, initiating an intellectual and popular tradition of cultural despair that carried over to the
subsequent century. Attacks on modernity found its strongest roots in Germany based upon the fact
that these intellectuals and their political criticisms genuinely reflected German cultural traditions.90
This internal dialogue further focused on real weaknesses, highlighted the faults, and presented a new
outlet for despair in a country more politically divisive than its neighbors.91 In the face of such
cultural despair these intellectuals worked to create new terms on which to accept society, and by
doing so created social conditions and mores which incorporated popular prejudices. Romantic
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intellectuals and their supporters remained driven by the desire to once again purify German culture
based upon historical traditions and myths about German society subscribed to by the population.92
In the end these men began the “conservative revolution” for Kulturreligion which emphasized the
rejection of rationalism, internationalism, and pacifism. German Fascists implemented this revolution
following the resurrection of support for such ideas at the popular level, as evidenced by the
democratic process at work in the election of 1933.93
This brand of intellectualism sought to reconcile the popular movement of Romantic
Nationalism with conservative ideological tenets, thoroughly inspiring the National Socialists. Paul
Lagarde, author of Deutsche Schrifter, proclaimed that in order to emulate the liberals, the German
people succumbed to a loss of faith, disunity of people, a decline of morality, and a poor education
system which further instilled these hallmarks of modernity. Lagarde remained the most vocal
proponent of Kulturreligion, or roughly, the religion of the people’s culture. The nation, in his view,
housed the complete soul of the people, of which each individual possessed a portion as a means for
creating a whole out of many. The materialism of modernity however, destroyed this purpose by
emphasizing the role of the individual rather than the national consciousness, thus creating disunity.
Only when the needs of the soul become recognized as greater than material needs can all
souls be fed and the unity of the nation restored. National religion then will spring forth from the
Volk (ethnic people) and supplant the political aspect of the state with a religious one. Once
Germany reached this level of internal strength, the only option was to validate this power through
conflict with external enemies, romanticized by the righteousness of the action. By propagating this
mystical nationalism with a Christian façade, Lagarde found his scapegoat in the Jewish population.
By equating them with the liberalism destroying Germany, and thus validating his own Anti92
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Semitism, he required the removal of the Jews to initiate social change as a means for spiritual
reform.
In Rembrandt als Erzieher, Julius Langbehn articulated his argument against liberalism and
modernity, exploring facets of Anti-Semitism and the rejection of reason and science and explicating
ideas for Kunstpolitik (political art). For Langbehn, art represents the highest source of good,
providing true knowledge, virtue, and ultimately morality in all of its forms simply because art
allows for the fusion of many ideas that in reason are irrational or contradictory by nature.
According to Langbehn, a new moral order must precede the development of Kunstpolitik through a
revolution in morals and politics which actually depoliticizes the process. Kunstpolitik in its truest
form can only exist in this manner because, according to Langbehn, the right kinds of art for
providing national moral and cultural salvation are undemocratic and unscientific.94 When art
portrays the absolute moral and political truth it becomes undemocratic because, according to
Langbehn, only one interpretation of the work exists and liberalism promotes competing analyses
which fracture national politics and sentiment. Creating Kunstpolitik requires the formation of a link
between art and politics with the Volk to remind people of their deep historical roots and awaken the
existing desire to return to them.
Although this desire to regenerate the nation lost to modernity remained a popular movement,
Langbehn asserts the people required the strength of a Führer. Chosen by the people, this Führer
should unite the Volk and abolish politics by nationalizing the Social Democratic Party in an effort to
rescue the romantic peasant and therefore the true German identity.95 The intent then never focused
on the Germanic movement as political in nature but a Romantic Nationalist one based on historical
and cultural bonds and expanding imperially under the direction of the popularly chosen Führer to
create a German Weltreich identified by the authority of its people (and not the state apparatus) who
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rejected modernity and therefore liberalism and Jews. Though Langbehn’s final theory created a
paradox, for he opposed economic expansion while promoting territorial gains, it quickly took root
among the more idealistic members of society finding commonality with reactionary and protoFascist groups and the emerging nationalist youth movement.
In the grand tradition of German romantic philosophy, no work embodies the scope and
origins of Hitler’s National Socialism than Arthur Möller Van Den Bruck’s Das Dritte Reich (1923),
written to acknowledge Germany’s current cultural upheaval and combine the existing ideologies of
Kulturreligion and Kunstpolitik by further attacking liberalism and the lack of culture embedded in
modern civilization. Van Den Bruck viewed modern culture as a clash between old and young
peoples, with the Germans as a group of young people who endured years of hardship, struggling to
exist within the evolutionary process. Because the evolutionary process meant the necessity of
violence, Van Den Bruck stressed the need for imperialism as war evoked unity and a collective
purpose among the people and became a means for release from old culture and creating a new
weltanschauung. This world view focused on the Primat der Aussenpolitik, using foreign policy to
divert attention from internal issues and enhancing the unity and prosperity of the nation.96
By effectively following this program the Third Reich would be capable of ending all
domestic strife, reconciling classes, and embodying the new German Empire through a single
Führer. Van Den Bruck, an overt proponent of race-based ideology, frequently used Anti-Semitism
as a tactic for discrediting and attacking both Marxism and liberalism as intellectually inferior to the
conservative movement.97 Ultimately, Das Dritte Reich promoted the ideal state based on a
synthesis between individualism and collectivity, and reconciliation of the nation. It did provided a
myth of redemption for Germany, influencing the idealists and romantic conservatives of the era. By
appropriating ideas from each of the three authors’ manifestos and synthesizing them with Hegelian
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and Social Darwinist views of history and society, the National Socialists created their own program
of German redemption and race-based ideology readily recognizable to the German population.
An ideological program then existed, accompanied by a general plan of action. But,
framework is not an equivalent for implementation, making the intentionalist approach problematic
for the Nazis. This led the party leadership to adopt a functionalist approach, thus becoming a
synthesis of intentionalism and functionalism. Hitler and his staff constantly used a strategy of
Massenpsychologie, perfecting mass suggestions in speeches, condoning Anti-Semitism, and reevaluating the use and value of existing institutions.98 Importantly though, there is a difference
between brainwashing and the exploitation of existing fears and beliefs. The program of
Massenpsychologie exploited the collective unconsciousness and the ability of unconnected
individuals to influence each other in their opinions and behaviors. Spontaneity does not affect the
masses, but rather group participants are a product of their modern lives, which is the position
Theodor Adorno takes in his essay “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda” (1991).
Large rallies and spectacles linking the Führer to the crowd in public representation are superficial at
best, negated by the leaders’ recognition of crowd consciousness.99 Furthermore, both the
Convergence Theory and Emergent-Norm Theory of mass psychology state that people in crowds
express existing beliefs and values, guided by norms and conscious decision-making, with crowdspeople moving into different and clear roles.100 Hitler then, did not brainwash the German
population, he merely played a leadership role in the crowd (as predicted by Langbehn), expressing a
collective pre-existing belief and value system. This analysis of the psychology behind Fascism
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challenges the notion that the success of Hitler’s Nazi party was a historic anomaly, because he did
not create these sentiments and emotions for a blind irrational crowd.
Without unique ideas about causes of dissatisfaction with life in Germany to present and the
cultural siege on the nation long-entrenched in the minds of the nation, Hitler’s program required no
indoctrination of the population with a completely new national ideology; he merely needed to
reassure the Volk that the goal of purity was indeed the correct path for the state to revive the glory of
the nation. Even if unprepared for the continual radicalization and functionalist implementation of
this nationalist program, the population undeniably allowed an individual leader, who mirrored their
sentiments, to take charge of the state government in an effort to satisfy their desires for stronger
nation. The democratic process, after all, permitted Hitler’s party to gain the necessary number of
seats in the Reichstag and become the largest single party in the legislative body, making the
takeover of power possible.101
Individuals at all levels of German society participated in elections, rallies, and clubs that
built popular support for National Socialism and pushed the group into a powerful position of federal
state politics. Traditionally, Fascism faces characterization as a phenomenon of the lower-middle
classes, radicalized by depression and fear of the proletariat.102 In reality though, the force driving
the population to the party is not so simple. National Socialism focused on presenting messages of
cultural loss and despair in conceptual terms in addition to concrete fears of economic distress and
revolution, the latter two offering less of a national incentive to participate. Incorporating only
studies on lower-middleclass segments of the population ignores the wider cultural function and
appeal of the rhetoric; it also ignores the fact that the lower-middle class did not have sufficient
voting power to place the NSDAP in a dominant position in the Reichstag. In Weimar Germany
measures of social identity eclipsed levels of income, including occupational status. The economic
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conditions were enhanced by the government policies which did not uniformly affect the German
population. Accordingly, the constituent base changed as a response to economic conditions:
hyperinflation and stabilization practices, depression, and unemployment. Furthermore, the proposed
measures to deal with the crises did not uniformly affect all income levels.103 Public support for the
Nazi party shifted based on the priorities individuals or interest groups possessed regarding which
policies affected their specific income levels, not because lower-income individuals were more
dissatisfied than any other group.
In different communities, Länder, and regions, voting patterns provide a more reliable
portrait of popular support than reviewing the membership numbers of the NSDAP as gaps exist
between the number of registered members and votes cast. Since a disproportionate number of
registered members existed as compared to number of votes cast, one cannot conclude that only these
lower-middle class members cast a vote in support of the Nazis. From 1924-1933 voting trends tend
to support the conclusion that the social composition of Nazi constituency evolved in accordance
with economic and cultural views of the period.104 Distaste for invasive government, big business,
Christian values, and ethnic beliefs all swayed voters outside of the lower-middle class to cast a vote
for the NSDAP. Party rhetoric provided those individuals with larger incomes with an incentive to
cast a ballot for the Nazis. Large business owners feared government involvement and strict
stabilization controls. Small shop owners feared uncontrollable competition from big business.
Christians feared the rise in an atheistic communism. All feared the subversive nature of Jews and
“others.” The Nazi electoral process relied on knowledge of possible voter bases and the specific
factors driving all segments of the population to Nazi rhetoric to make the party successful and
skillful at interacting with the population on a local level. Often small towns and urban centers
behaved as microcosms of the larger state, leading to studies in popular psychology and groupthink
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in the face of NSDAP propaganda.105 Creating a sense of action, progress and an end to
unemployment, the Nazis infiltrated many social, sporting, and other types of clubs susceptible to
this rhetoric because of their infusion with a great sense of nationalism.
In many cases these towns possessed characteristics of Anti-Semitism which did not yet rely
on the use of violence to approach the issue of purifying the German nation by forcibly removing the
offensive “others.” Lack of action by National Socialism’s political competition and the fear of
unfamiliar rhetoric (especially the SPD in the case of petite bourgeoisie and their fear of the Marxist
worker element) drove many Germans to the NSDAP as the party provided an aura of familiarity and
comfort regarding many of the crucial issues. At the local level, many found a revitalization of their
passions and a radicalized belief in the party to protect the nation through the state apparatus. In
many cases local Nazi leaders worked on their own initiative with no direction from above to mold
and customize party rhetoric to meet the demands of the Volk and alleviate the fears of the local
population. Opposing parties needed equally intelligent and credible forms of national radicalism,
yet failed to respond to economic and cultural conditions in a suitable manner.106 The failure of the
KPD, SPD, and others to address the desires of the public majority left these parties in openly
vulnerable to the rhetoric of the NSDAP.
An inability to appeal to masses based on unifying expressions of national strength, honor,
and purity created a gap in the political spectrum for a form of politics that foremost demanded and
encouraged unfiltered displays of emotion for that entity which may be the most emotional of them
all: the nation. The opposition remained too pragmatic during a period of idealistic regression in the
face of so many wounded national egos. National Socialism undoubtedly filled this emotional gap,
representing the will of the German population and successfully using the democratic process to gain
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power and install Hitler as the Führer of the Fascist regime, meeting the romantic nationalist goal of
politicizing cultural uniformity.
The Nazis did indeed establish a regime using these national myths and romantic theories,
ably launching a horrifically successful extermination plan as well as a hugely destructive war. Their
ability to institute this regime depended on a combination of economic, emotional, and political
factors related to the national myth. Financial instability of individuals and the German state led to
dissatisfaction with daily life that drove many Germans to the NSDAP. The attraction was
exacerbated by the inability of normal, existing parties to counter Nazi rhetoric or offer viable
solutions. Beyond economic concerns they also provided emotional comfort to German citizens by
providing concrete ideas about an idealized German nation that could rally around a strong leader
and actualize their internal strength as a people. The popularity of this Nazi program proved a
defining moment in German history, creating a stigmatizing identity that forced subsequent
governments to dedicate great effort to re-defining and changing perceptions of Germany and the
nation.
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CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: BALANCING POWER IN POST-WAR EUROPE

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Allied occupation, the victorious Allies
essentially took control of the state and kept a watchful eye over the German people, something akin
to a wise adult carefully watching a small child. The entire process of occupation and division
indicated nothing less than the total lack of trust felt by the Allied Powers toward Germany and its
ability to control itself politically. American, Soviet, British, and French governments all feared the
re-emergence of a brutal and violent Fascist regime, and so decided to insert themselves as a
moderating force. Overall, the feeling surely persisted that in the end the War Guilt Clause of the
Versailles settlement was not overly zealous in its punishment of Germany, but rather pre-mature in
its application. German culpability for the destruction of Europe during World War II validated the
necessity for a re-defined national identity. The exact definition for the meaning of German though,
remained ambiguous. The only certainty was that this new Germany must be radically distinct from
its predecessors; internationally this meant a retreat from the offensive posturing and unchecked
aggression of the Nazi regime.
The result of German actions in World War II confirmed the massive collapse of a security
system designed to maintain a balance by keeping rival state interests in check and at a distance from
one another by suppressing state projections of power rather than accounting for them. The outbreak
of two catastrophic world wars forced leading European politicians to realize that the persistence of
security systems based on the premise that state interests are mutually exclusive will ultimately fail.
An international system based on independently acting sovereign nation-states was inherently
unstable, creating an environment where state interests asserted primacy over European interests. In
the era of modern warfare, such instability proved ruinous. Continent-wide destruction reinforced
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the notion that the actions of one state affected the well-being of those around it, and that the same
principle held true for successes and failures of international relations, both political and economic.
This concept laid the foundational basis for instituting a co-operative European body
designed to clarify and pointedly involve the notion of collective security through the process of first
economic and then political integration, which legalized the recognition of mutually dependent goals
and inseparable links between states through a framework of treaties. These treaties began
institutionalizing a meaning for the vague abstraction that is the term “European,” capable of
ostracizing and “othering” non-participants. The general site of the German state, location, size,
population, and precedent for strong leadership in European affairs meant that no European coalition
could effectively function and find success without the participation of Germany.107 Although the
French and British states remained eager to see payments of reparations and the fault for war placed
squarely on German shoulders, it was understood that political and economic isolation as a
punishment might only lead to a repeat of circumstances leading to World War II. The potential for
Germany to regress back into a pattern of Fascist leadership remained the overarching concern and
ultimately led many European leaders to keep Germany at arms’ length and regard that state as a
defeated subordinate rather than a peer.
After the federal elections for the newly united Bundesrepublik Deutschland (the BRD
referred to in chapters 5 and 6 as “Germany”) in 1949, the new democratic leadership realized the
need to lay new groundwork in order for the Western world to trust Germany again. Passive cooperation would not suffice, however, as this risked repeating the mutually exclusive political
distance that proved so disastrous during the first half of the century. If Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
and President Theodor Heuss ever hoped to re-integrate the state into the international community,
then Germany required an active and radical shift in the ideology behind the nation’s international
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relations strategy. Knowing that the identity and image of Nazi-era Germany needed complete
erasure, both men first looked to the international arena. To rebuild the domestic economy and
generate new forms of political satisfaction German state leaders needed to participate in the general
rebuilding of Europe by cooperatively inserting themselves in international affairs. Rejecting the
Nazi brand of international relations, Adenauer and Heuss sought to create a feeling of
rapprochement, border security, and humility within the international community. A lifelong
opponent of Nazism, Heuss attempted to promote security and stability in Europe by firmly
advocating for denying the necessity that Germany rearm itself following the war.
Though the Bundestag ultimately voted in favor of rearmament, the continual presence of
influential leaders with pacifistic views and dissenting opinions within the government, especially at
the federal level, gave their peers in other European and world government’s greater confidence in
the German ability to normalize and maintain peaceful relations. The French though remained
nervous and uneasy after two violent wars. Sharing a common border with Germany almost 448
kilometers in length, France considered itself the most vulnerable to German aggression.108 As a
remedy, French foreign minister Robert Schuman presented the Shuman Declaration, his idea for
linking the economies of France and Germany, thereby creating a sense of unity and replacing the
rivalry and friction of the past. Initiated in 1950, the agreement was rather simplistic but nonetheless
important in outlining its assumptions. Central to the Shuman Declaration was the necessity of
pooling the production capabilities of the French Lorraine regions with the valuable industries of the
German Ruhr: coal and steel. Despite the economic considerations, the plan was at heart political.
The two working economies were tightly interwoven and highly dependent on one another in
maintaining the level of prosperity required to rebuild the two states, forcing both governments to
work in tandem when producing economic policies. According to Shuman, war between France
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and Germany in this case would become “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”109
Ergo, not only would Germany be unable to instigate conflict, but if it did it would damage its own
economy and political relationships.
Most surprising to the international community though was not French ratification in the face
of socialist opposition, but rather that the leadership of West Germany showed immediate signs of
warm reception to such an alliance. In both his official and private correspondences to Robert
Shuman, Adenauer reassured the French statesman that he had “no doubt that the decision [by the
German cabinet] would be favorable” to German entrance into the Council of Europe.110 In light of
the previous 70 years of Franco-German conflict, active acceptance of the Shuman Plan - more than
any other action thus far - represented Germany’s willing commitment to abandon National
Socialism and embrace the cause of Europe. Adenauer’s ultimate concern and goal for the Schuman
Declaration, in addition to the inauguration of a collective security system, rested equally on the
desperation to rebuild the Germany economy into a viable force capable of supporting its citizens and
gaining international acceptance.
The Schuman Declaration was only the first of several means for attaining this goal. As a
former politician and resistor of the Nazi-era state, Adenauer possessed an acute awareness regarding
the correlation between economic stability and the success of Nazi propaganda at the popular level.
As chancellor, he set about moving beyond the Shuman Plan to deeper levels of cooperation with
other European states. In this task, Adenauer had significant help. Since the creation of a single
territory out of the Allied Tri-Zone and the re-instatement of the West German government in 1949,
the new German government found a powerful ally and supporter in the United States. The same
109

Robert Schuman, “Declaration of 9 May 1950: Speech presented from the French Foreign Ministry”
Selection of texts concerning institutional matters of the Community from 1950 to 1982 (Luxembourg: European
Parliament - Committee on Institutional Affairs, 1982), 47-48, http://www.ena.lu/, (accessed 7 July 2008).
110
Konrad Adenauer, “Personal reply by Konrad Adenauer to Robert Schuman,” Bonn, 9 May 1950;
“Official reply by Konrad Adenauer to Robert Schuman,” Bonn, 8 May 1950,.L'Europe une longue marche, trans.
The CVCE (Lausanne: Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Centre de recherches européennes, 1985), p. 63,
http://www.ena.lu/ (accessed 10 July 2008).

81

year as the formation of the Bundestag, the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty to form
NATO along with a host of other Western European states including, France, Great Britain, Italy,
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (the latter three as the Benelux). All signed onto and
supported the alliance for its key feature: a mutual defense clause. Lord Ismay, first Secretary
General of NATO, summed up the situation by stating the organization’s goal: “to keep the Russians
out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”111
In contrast, the U.S. desired a plan calling for the acceptance of Germany as a full NATO ally
and militarization of the state. Rationally, NATO needed German terrain though several signatory
states and members of the German government opposed such a move. Without it, the strategic plans
of the organization’s command lacked sufficient depth for defensive maneuvers.112 The French
though, showed their dissatisfaction with a strengthened German military by introducing an alternate
plan of action in 1950. Originally named the Pléven Plan after the French Defense Minister René
Pléven, it became the framework for the European Defense Community (EDC) with the purpose of
essentially limiting the role and effect of the U.S. in developing a German defense system. The
French suggested that the Germans only obtain the opportunity to re-arm under the supervision of an
integrated continental army.
Adhering to his pattern of support for cooperation and integration, Adenauer enthusiastically
pursued the implementation of the EDC. Speaking before the Bundestag on February 7, 1952, the
Chancellor forcefully communicated the need for participation in the EDC on the practical basis of
defense against the Soviet threat and the ideological step toward German reunification:
“Der Generalvertrag enthält zunächst eine Präambel, und in dieser
Präambel stehen folgende wichtige Punkte. Zunächst wird festgestellt, daß es
das gemeinsame Ziel der Signatarstaaten ist, die Bundesrepublik auf der
Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung in die europäische Gemeinschaft
einzugliedern, und jetzt kommt ein sehr wichtiger Satz, den ich Ihnen wörtlich
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vorlessen möchte: ‘die sich interseits in die sich entwickelnde atlantische
Gemeinschaft einfugen wird’. Es it dann in einem weiteren Passus
festgestellt, daß die Schaffung eines völlig freien and vereinigten
Deutschlands auf friedlichem Wege and die Herbeiführung einer frei
vereinbarten friedensvertraglichen Regelung ein grundlegendes and
gemeinsames Ziel der Signatarstaaten ist.”113
“This treaty contains, first of all, a preamble, and in this preamble
are the following points. First, we will realize, that the joint aim of the
signatory states is the incorporation of the Federal Republic [Germany] into
the European Community on the basis of equality. Now comes a very
important clause that I must read aloud to you word for word: ‘their part
would fit into the emerging Atlantic community.’ It is then in a later passage
ascertained that the creation of a completely free and united Germany,
agreed upon by a path of peaceful leadership and a peace treaty settlement, is
a fundamental and common goal of the signatory states.”

Even with Adenauer’s constant lobbying, ultimately the EDC failed, rejected first by the
British and U.S., and finally later by the French themselves in 1954. The EDC’s failure continued to
limit the German role in continental affairs to economic collaboration under the Schuman Plan,
though many parties hailed the process as a success that created a space for future political and
military negotiations and collaborations. The U.S. proclaimed the creation a framework for an
enduring peace between the French and German people.114 Chancellor Adenauer said of the
Declaration, “It’s our breakthrough.”115 This statement not only illustrated the Chancellor’s
satisfaction with Germany’s current re-integration progress, but also emphasized his outlook for
positive future and further involvement in European affairs as a working (and friendly) partner. The
Schuman Plan successfully integrated the economies of Germany and France, and other Western
European states saw the profitable and peaceful benefits of implementing such a system, specifically
Italy and the Benelux, which comprised the oversight committee of the Schuman Plan.
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In 1951, Germany, Italy, France, and the Benelux assembled in France to sign the Treaty of
Paris and establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which provided the original
model for later attempts at deepening European integration, with Germany playing a key and leading
role. Provisions of the treaty included a High Authority to manage the industries, a Common
Assembly, and Council of Ministers to manage the day-to-day effects of close economic interaction
in a supra-national capacity. The resulting common market for these industries operated on freely set
market prices and without artificial mechanisms of import/export tariffs. A stronger treaty
integrating more economies as well as the political systems of the states involved reaffirmed
Germany’s commitment to a peaceful Europe, cooperation instead of antagonism, and a complete
reversal of the National Socialist foreign policy. When the ECSC formally began operating in 1952
under the direction of French Minister Jean Monnet, Germany further assuaged any fear about its
intentions by willingly entering into an agreement to guarantee coal to the French steel industry,
upgrade Belgian and Italian coal mines, and dismantle its own steel cartels, further gaining the
respect of the international community.116 To advance these ideas to a wider audience, the German
Chancellor brought his message to the United Kingdom. Speaking on May 14, 1953 in London,
Adenauer clearly emphasized European integration and the necessity of the United Kingdom’s
participation.117 Presenting this message personally before the International Press Institute served to
bolster Adenauer and his message as highly influential, making his the leading voice in the debate for
integration and solidifying the German position as highly cooperative. Certainly, the fact that the
German government’s actions met the expectations provided by their rhetoric also increased their
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legitimacy in the eyes of the international community; a detail that Adenauer and his cabinet did not
neglect.
The success of the ECSC both economically and in its minimal political role encouraged the
six states to expand the market beyond coal and steel to all internationally traded goods, or a total
customs union. Germany, France, Italy, and the Benelux states summarily signed the Treaties of
Rome in 1957 creating the European Economic Community (EEC) instituting a common market with
no internal tariffs and a uniform external tariff. Along with the EEC though, Rome also constructed
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), a body designed to oversee the joint
development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Participating statesmen believed in the
necessity for nuclear energy development in an attempt to ensure energy security by “tackling the
general shortage of conventional energy of the time.”118 Since Germany’s re-armament in 1955, the
state made no moves to build up arms or intimidate its neighbors, though many signatory states
remained uneasy about the lingering potential for German aggression. The emphasis of Euratom
therefore indicated a commitment to coordinated, controlled nuclear development by regulating
facility investment, uniformity of safety standards, dissemination of information, and safeguards to
prevent the diversion of civil nuclear materials to other, mainly military, purposes.119 Dedication to
the Treaties of Rome by all ECSC members further illustrated both Adenauer’s commitment to peace
and the official changes to the German government’s rhetoric and policy.
Germany’s continued devotion to economic integration resulted in a gradual spill-over into
the political sphere as well. With the EEC’s inception also came the creation of a host of political
bodies designed to carrying the weight of supra-national authority and subordinate state interests to
European ones. To govern and oversee effective cooperation and organization, the EEC possessed a
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Council of Ministers, Commission, and Parliamentary assembly as an outlet for the opinions, desires,
and interests of all participating states. Furthermore, it also set up an independent non-partisan Court
of Justice to interpret Rome as well as settle disputes between the members that might ensue from
decisions of the community. These EEC institutions were extensions of the original bodies created
by the ECSC, including the High Authority, Common Assembly, Special Council of Ministers, and
the Court of Justice. With the advent of Rome and the expansion of organization, the EEC needed
greater oversight to match the pace and depth of spillover occurring in the political sphere. By the
end of the decade then, this process deeply entrenched Germany in European affairs, making it an
ally and full partner to its neighbors rather than a threat to stability or progress on the continent.
Importantly, these international changes to the German government’s official foreign policy
took place in a purely instrumental manner, influenced by the external forces of the United States and
France as well as the decision of political elites internally.120 The emplacement of Germany in the
international community and Europe regarding issues of supra-nationalism and the decision to forgo
total sovereignty in favor of cooperation remained very much a top-down process as the state never
called a referendum for popular opinion in determining the matter. The assumption for this course of
action certainly lies with the German government’s understanding of public political opinions of the
time. In the immediate aftermath of World War II and during the reconstruction process, a sizable
portion of the population still held favorable views of the National Socialist Party and, barring
outright support for the NSDAP, certainly at the very least an even larger number held strong proGerman nationalistic sentiments.121 Popular attitudes supporting the superiority of Germany would
doubtlessly provide a roadblock to European integration. Many of these nationalistic sentiments
gained traction based on the history of memory, re-enforced by the experiences of World War I and
the occupation of the Ruhr valley by the French. Given this past, an element of distrust existed
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regarding the French motives for not only participating in, but also initiating the ECSC through the
Shuman Declaration. Providing the German population with a referendum on the matter generated a
greater chance of yielding a negative outcome than seeing large-scale support for such policies.
Adenauer and his political allies realized they needed to disregard popular opinion in order for their
program of re-defining German national identity to take root successfully.
While there had been prior flirtation with European integration, the EEC far exceeded
anything previously experienced in the Pan-European movement. The purposes and logistics for the
process made the EEC (and the European Union in its current form) unique in the scope of
integration movements. The conviction behind this Pan-Europeanism, and likewise the inspiration
for the coalitions and treaties discussed above, emerged from the notion that only politically unified
states could overcome the history of the continent that bore responsibility for recent catastrophic
human events. Pan-Europe then theoretically functioned to secure peace internally by creating a
supranational structure based on obligatory arbitration and multi-lateral cooperation. The general
assumption in this process revolves around the understanding that state sovereignty in the present
form cannot remain permanently intact, as Europeanization naturally involves the state’s forfeiture of
some of the obligations previously reserved solely for its discretion. This, of course, affects the
state’s distinct privilege as a protector of the national culture. The use of Romantic Nationalism for
justification of the state as a cultural container placed the movement at odds with Pan-European
ideals.
Conceiving further of Pan-Europe meant the beginning of a conscientious procedure
regarding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, or the active process of deciding what constitutes
– defines - Europe. This provides an important context for discerning the practicality of the idea of
Europe. Even in the initial stages of integration, state sovereignty originally presented a strong
obstacle to overcome, presumably on a deeper level as the nature of this integration theoretically
requires “building blocks,” or steps, to work correctly. This effort to build a single united Europe is
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in accord with Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s expectation that Europe, and not the
nation or state, shall act as the constituent socio-cultural entity.122 In other words, Europe as defined
during the future stages of deep-level integration will provide the sole cultural container, not the
state, in an effort to include and create a plane of equals among varying and existing cultures. A
process such as this, in theory, provides a level of tolerance and cultural stability previously
considered untenable and protects minority populations against discrimination through an emphasis
on human rights. This ideology of dedication to human rights and cultural relativism stemmed from
the recent severely violent manifestation of Anti-Semitism in the Holocaust as well as the consistent
repression of “othered” peoples. Undeniably then, economic integration must operate as the primary
component in the integration process as it tends to force human/cultural interactions.123 Strong
supporters of the Pan-European ideal first rooted themselves within the French and German
governments through the likes of Schuman, Monnet, and Adenauer at the international level. These
men laid the foundation for the evolution of the European Union and the longest period of peace at
any time in modern European history.
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CHAPTER 6
NEW GERMAN POLITICS: GOVERNMENT POLICY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Rebuilding international relationships required German leaders to break radically from the
foreign policy carried out by their Nazi predecessors. Not only did this allow for the state’s reception
into world politics, but it also planted the seeds for economic regeneration. The success of this
external re-imagining, however, could not continue to be successful for a substantial period of time
without a parallel domestic program. Re-defining Germany required a total re-invention of the state
on an internal scale, re-working the political, economic, and ultimately cultural systems. The core
need to change entirely and the idea of “German” proved to be the driving force of the era.
Politically and economically, the state remained shattered, with faith in Germany’s strength as a
nation wavering after two crushing defeats in a row.
Although international rebuilding efforts proceeded swiftly and rather smoothly, state and
regional politicians realized that Germany would never be independently strong or taken truly
seriously in the international community if domestic changes did not occur as well. They therefore
set out on a program to re-imagine German national identity domestically while simultaneously
making those international changes. A program of this nature required the creation of a new meaning
of “German” and so a radical change in the nationalism used to connect the nation to the state
occurred. In the past, the emphasis rested on popular forms of nationalism, relying on the consent of
an imagined community created by the masses who transferred their will onto the political state.
Now though, post-World War II Germany experienced the implementation of the instrumental form
of nationalism where the political state transferred its will onto a culture, community, and society; in
this instance identity is mandated for the masses. Though the majority of this program originated at
the federal level in the Bundestag, accordingly the implementation largely took place at the level of
the Länder by regional politicians more adept at handling such a change of identity in the face of
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localized barriers and challenges. At federal and local levels, political leaders attempted to distance
themselves from the inflammatory, race-based, primordial nationalist ideology of the Nazi era. It
appears 1945 is the year Germany attempted to lose its navel.
With the intent to initiate an ideological shift in the state, the occupying Allied powers
engaged in a rigorous program of “de-Nazification” as the method for purging Nation Socialist party
members – and therefore Holocaust perpetrators – from all level of government and public society.
Formally the occupying powers created a system designed to punish active Nazis and militarists
leading to a broader agenda. As a de-Nazification Report from 1948 reiterates:
“All members of the party [NSDAP] more than nominal participants .
. . shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of
responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be
replaced by persons, who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed
capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in
Germany.”124
Instituted primarily as a form of punishment and an act to cleanse Germany for Allied
political purposes, ultimately such actions functioned to derive an apologetic myth suggesting the
blame for perpetrating such large-scale violence lay with powerful individuals. De-Nazification was
originally an Allied impetus for the re-definition of Germany and the targeting of specific individuals
for retribution. This absolution of the German population, however, only served to re-enforce the
notion that the ideology of National Socialism remained an acceptable viewpoint to subscribe to
since popular National Socialism only allowed collective Romantic Nationalist myths about
“German” Kultur to remain present in popular society. In the new myth of National Socialism
formulated at the end of the war, the general population was responsible for celebrating and
protecting German heritage and culture and not for perpetuating racially motivated violence. The
problem with this new myth, however, is that it condones the perpetuation of racially motivated
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forms of discrimination that, since they claim legitimacy as truly German, rely on the state apparatus
to protect their cultural viewpoints and heritage from “outsiders.” In essence, the occupying forces
carried out de-Nazification on the false basis that National Socialism was a purely instrumental
movement.
The pervasive affects of such a fallacy yielded immediate and measurable results of the deNazification program. When the program began in 1945, an emphasis lay on the process of reducing
the numbers of National Socialist leaders and engaging in a mental evaluation of the population.
Armed with teams of psychologists, the U.S. Army under General Lucius Clay proceeded to
distribute Fragebogen in the American and British occupied zones in order to collect data on the
extent of Nazi participation.125 These lengthy questionnaires required German citizens to provide a
detailed history of their activism with the NSDAP.126 Of the 12 million Fragebogen returned 3.6
million actually received indictments for the willing involvement and participation in crimes against
humanity.127 Of these millions of indictments, only about 5,000 convictions were handed down,
ending with a total of 486 executions by 1947.128
These findings indicated that participation in National Socialism in an active manner – or
even more passively such as through youth groups, women’s societies, or professional organizations
– permeated society at the popular level more deeply than realized. Leaders of the occupied zones
remained hard-pressed to locate civil servants, administrators, educators, and press members
somehow not involved with the Nazi party. In order to differentiate between levels of collaboration,
the Allies systematically divided all returned Fragebogen into five separate categories. Thus
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Figure 6.1. – Sample de-Nazification Fragebogen. A member of the Waffen-SS, Robert Mulka was
assigned to the concentration camp at Auschwitz. Mulka claims he was unaware of the deaths in the
camp, though he was tried and sentenced to imprisonment.
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administrative problems of finding capable and politically “clean” Germans among millions placed
greater pressure on the Allies in their bid to reenergize the state economically and politically. DeNazification arguably impeded this process a great deal and as a result the British and French
proceedings against German citizens remained consistently proportionally lower than the U.S.
occupied zone.129 The industrial nature of the British and French sectors and their necessity for quick
economic recovery no doubt contributed to this lack of tribunal proceedings, especially in the newly
formed state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW).130
By 1946 however, the tribunals for convicting National Socialist war crimes were set up
under the Germans with Allied oversight as the Allies were more focused on other issues. Though
still requiring Allied approval and guidance for most decisions, this charge to the Germans to punish
themselves was the first step in regaining control of domestic affairs and politics. The general
consensus, then and now, indicates the failure of the de-Nazification program in accomplishing its
goals for psychologically “re-wiring” the German population. Only one year after the war, 1 in 3
Germans still agreed that Jews should not be granted the same rights as members of the “German”
race.131 Noticeably, de-Nazification had a slight overall positive effect on society. Pressure of deNazification in the year following German defeat forced hardcore Nazi enthusiasts to keep a low
profile at a time when the embryonic institutions of the West German state – political parties, Land
administrations, the press, and the educational system – were being established.132
Such effects might be regarded as marginal and temporary considering the Allied inability to
eliminate completely National Socialist feelings in the immediate post-war years, and most likely
play a significant role in contemporary right-wing politics and violence in today’s unified Germany.
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Merely keeping Nazi ideology out of state politics did little to alter popular sentiment as by 1952
roughly 37 percent of the population surveyed believed Germany would be better with no Jews on its
territory, an increase in numbers and possibly a radicalization in sentiment since the 1946 survey.133
Simultaneously, 25 percent still possessed a good opinion of Hitler.134
Considered an impediment to healthy economic and social growth in Germany, deNazification began to receive criticism from even the most anti-Nazi officials. In 1947 NRW
President Konrad Adenauer voiced his dissatisfaction with the policy on the grounds that it was
doing no good, lasted too long, and would eventually provoke a nationalist backlash.135 By all
accounts Adenauer’s conceptualization of the de-Nazification problem rang true. The ineffectiveness
and length of the process proved a futile measure destined to fracture the nation and marginalize
those citizens deeply committed to German Kultur, ultimately forcing the ultra-nationalists to react
with violence. This instability coupled with shortages of civil servants and other employees created a
major obstacle for the post-war state. Maintaining a functioning society and expanding economic
growth meant that de-Nazification could not occur in its most thorough form as it left the state
without enough employees to fill jobs openings. Despite high rates of firings due to Nazi
involvement or sympathy, by 1948 the Land of Bavaria rehired 50 percent of fired teachers in an
effort to bolster a weakened education system, creating an overall trend of universities, legal system
members, and businessmen receiving little or no penalty.136 As overall rates of unemployment
remained high due to economic contraction, many employers hired the most qualified workers,
regardless of past associations with the NSDAP. Considering the scope of popular political
involvement, it is imaginable that the number of employed NSDAP members and supporters
remained proportionally high. Until the late 1950s after a period of strong economic growth the state
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did not aggressively pursue policies of incorporating refugee Germans and Gastarbeiter into the
workforce.137 Combined with the rehiring of former National Socialist party members these policies
worked to reduce unemployment in Germany from 9.1 percent in 1951 to 1.3 percent in 1960.138
Even within Germany many Länder with high levels of industrialization magnified the effects of deNazification, refugees, Gastarbeiter, and post-war economic conditions. These Land represented the
German effort to implement policies aimed at encouraging social, economic, and political growth.
Of the West German Länder at the time, none provides a more compelling case study of the struggle
for national re-definition than Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW).
Located in the Rheinland with its capital at Düsseldorf, Nordrhein-Westfalen proved the
breeding ground for several of immediate post-war Germany’s most famous politicians, such as
Konrad Adenauer and Karl Arnold, as well as the birthplace of the new Christian Democratic Union
party (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands; CDU) which emerged after the war and the
dissolution of National Socialism. As a highly industrialized Land, it also experienced both the
benefits of German war-time military production and the devastating blows of economic ruin at the
end of the war. NRW remained one of the Länder in greatest need of economic rebirth and
international reintegration. Experiences with the ECSC, migration patterns, population shifts, and
new political developments make it an exciting microcosm of the policies and practices occurring at
the federal level. In the same stroke, this region also highlights the failure of politicians to
implement fully the new idea of the nation.
Part of the reason why the post-war German government struggled so greatly to implement a
new German national identity is possibly because they lacked a solid definition. Pressed by the
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immediacy of rebuilding the state, political leaders operated on the basis that they were not Nazis and
that therefore “German” no longer included a dependence on racial ideology. The post-war concept
of the nation focused on respect for German cultural traditions with a broader inclusion of
cosmopolitan elements to reflect the agenda of internationalism promoted by the political and
intellectual leadership of the era. Ideally, “German” then related to one’s residence and participation
in existing traditions rather than a place of birth or ethnic heritage. This idea represents a shift in
describing a true “German” from one who is loyal to the nation to one who is loyal to the state.
Intellectual elites, though, proved unable to articulate such a definition in terms applicable and
appealing to the general population.
The ideology of National Socialism remained politically invisible, but post-war politicians
inadequately countered the race-based view of the nation and fear of outsiders that characterized
Nazi ideology and seemed to permeate society. Often policies and practices contradicted one
another, leading to inconsistencies in the implementation of the new nationalism. Politicians feared
to bring this issue to the public when the preoccupation with economic developments rather than
social and political ones influenced political opinion. This places the responsibility for the failure to
re-imagine German identity squarely on the shoulders of politicians, promoting the current political
ties to the problem of xenophobia. The problem, clearly, resided in the inability to create a more
encompassing definition of German within the ever broadening and changing idea of Europe.
In light of the massive immigration to West German, an inability to re-define “German” was
problematic as socio-cultural differences often exist independently of ethnicity. It is common for
immigrating ethnic Germans to practice unique non-German social and cultural rituals, while
immigrant peoples of separate ethnicities practice and incorporate traditionally German social rites
and culture into their lifestyles. Incongruencies such as these further blur the lines when it comes to
using ethnicity as a measure of the nation. Allowing the continuation of ethnicity as the deciding
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factor of national identification in the immediate post-war period did nothing to eliminate fear of
outsiders and the practice of excluding “others.”
Domestically, the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland – or constitution - played
a primary role in legally reconstructing the political post-war identity of the state and combating
National Socialist ideology.139 Comprised of 141 articles, the idea for the document originated with
the three Western occupying powers, which approved the re-creation of the German state and ended
the legal non-entity period. These Allies only granted this approval, however, upon the complete
rejection of the ideology of the German people as the master race and a renewed commitment to
human rights in a legally recognizable format. Passed by the Parliamentary Council on May 8, 1949,
and never approved by popular vote, the document did not have the effect of fundamental law until
first receiving approval by the occupying powers four days later, followed by Länder ratification on
May 23. The significance of this procedure is not to be overlooked. An initial approval and dictation
of terms for the constitution later ratified by the Länder definitely generates a pattern of statebuilding from the top down, with an external force and political elites determining and enforcing
these new values on the German people.
Unlike the previous Weimar constitution, state power in the Grundgesetz was directed
towards protecting basic rights, including human dignity, rights of liberty, equality before the law,
and freedom of faith. Equality before the law illustrates one of the most interesting articles for the
purposes of discussions about rights and citizens in the new Germany. Roughly translated, section 3
of article 3 states, “No one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex, his parentage, his race,
his language, his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.”140 Nowhere
else in the translation of the document are any references made to race, language, or place of origin.
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Likewise, the preamble states “this basic law is valid for the entire German people,” implying the
necessity of membership in the nation in order for these basic rights to have any force. The
constitution also frequently invokes the terms “Germans” and “German people” and goes as far as
defining “German” in Article 116 as one who possesses citizenship.141
Herein again lays the difficult issue of race, ethnicity, and citizenship. Even though the
constitution extends citizenship to all Germans, the co-existing Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz –
Nationality Law - traditionally based citizenship on the principle of jus sanguinis, meaning
citizenship status may be granted to those able to prove a Germanic bloodline and true ethnicity.142
Within the borders of the state not all peoples living within post-war Germany were ethnic Germans.
The combination of the two laws created a system where granting state citizenship meant
acknowledging legitimacy as a member of the nation. This Nationality Law, though a prejudiced
model for determining citizenship, remained in effect until January 1, 2000, when the principle of
subsidiarity behind the European Union essentially forced the German government to relax its
citizenship requirements. Currently, children of foreign parents born in the country are extended
citizenship while adult foreigners are granted greater rights in the process of naturalization. The goal
is to integrate the migrant population and better accommodate the needs of immigrants.
Legal applications of national identity such as this one indicate that the issue of race, though
no longer an official policy of the government today, is still a highly politicized issue in defining the
German nation and using citizenship tied to ethnicity as a tool of exclusion. The government
inadvertently promoted racial divides while simultaneously officially rejecting race-based ideology, a
pattern initiated in the post-war period with the failure to re-define the German nation. The German
government, furthermore, sent another series of mixed messages regarding the role of racial ideology
during the state’s reconstruction. Concerning measures of social reform, German leaders needed to
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implement social welfare practices proven to work, and kept in place many welfare practices of past
regimes (including Nazi-era programs aimed at encouraging high birth rates).143 This policy choice
further blurred lines and provided no real break in continuity between pre- and post-war Germany.
Few policies illustrate the post-war Government’s inability to demonstrate or provide a
model of the new national identity better than the Gastarbeiter program, which invited foreigners to
work and live in Germany. The German government and population treated immigrants as outsiders
temporarily occupying space in the state, when these Gastarbeiter provided the boon for Germany’s
economic miracle. The demographic catastrophe of World Wars I and II had removed the most
skilled and able workers from two generations, greatly reduced the population, and left large gaps in
the employment sector. Rebuilding industry quickly as part of such a massive reconstruction project
required a greater number of workers then were available among the extant German population. To
remedy the situation, initially the government began opening its borders to a number of so-called
Aussiedler, ethnic Germans of other states and German speakers expelled from their homes during
either World War. According to the new constitution, these people retained the rights to their
citizenship as they had been forcibly removed. Between 1950 and 1955 Aussiedler comprised the
majority of the 275,000 migrants entering the country.144 Even this influx of workers did not
alleviate the employment shortage in the industrial sector, prompting the government to initiate its
Gastarbeiter program.
Beginning in 1955, the federal government entered into a series of agreements to import ablebodied working men, first with Italy, followed by Spain and Greece in 1960 and Turkey in 1961.
Between 1955 and 1960 the migrant population shot up to 721,000 and reached an astounding
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899,000 over the next five year period.145 Nordrhein-Westfalen’s position as a heavily industrialized
state and important part of Germany’s backbone for participating in both the Schuman Plan and the
ECSC opened it up to high levels of immigration, and today it has a foreign population of 1,914,424
individuals, or 10.6 percent of the Land’s total population.146 Continued levels of migration and
citizenship acquisition between 1950 and 1970 correlate well with the spectacular economic growth
that made up Germany’s miracle and indicated that the state’s economic policies cannot continually
remain isolated from social policies of citizenship and the nation. The economic policies of inviting
foreign workers to Germany directly affected the organization of society, by changing the
complexion and cultural make-up of the German community. Those foreign individuals, responsible
for providing necessary labor to rebuild the German economy, lived in a system that made it legally
impossible to normalize themselves as “Germans.”
The government’s position on withholding citizenship from Gastarbeiter because of ethnic
differences sends the mixed signal to the general population that foreign workers do not belong in
Germany as a permanent group. Useful to the German population, but not accepted as members,
Gastarbeiter worked for the benefit of the official population, subservient “others” meant to exist
temporarily. Ideas of racial superiority and ethnic divisions persisted in citizenship policy; national
identity based on “othering” was a significant factor for the state even as it offered up a rhetoric
promoting tolerance and security for all people.
Primary responsibility for the promotion of tolerance and unity belonged to the Länder since
the new political system of post-World War II Germany was a federalist system. This provided the
Länder a framework in which to operate with greater sovereignty. A multi-party system
implemented at the state and regional level supported the democratic process and provided a plethora
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of ideological options to the general public. Noticeably, in accordance with the illegality of racebased ideology, the NSDAP and other parties related to the hateful rhetoric and discriminatory
practices of National Socialism and its offshoots remained absent from the political sphere. In its
place emerged two dominant parties, representing political ideologies of the moderate left and right.
Re-emerging on the left, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) supported the interests
of the working class and represented itself ideologically as a beacon of Marxist principles though in
an evolutionist manner to appeal to a larger cross-section of the voting public. Often the SPD’s
platform focused on the working conditions, rights, and wages of workers: unionized German
citizens.147
With the re-establishment of the SPD in 1946, chairman Kurt Schumacher (1946-1952) and
his successor Erich Ollenhauer (1952-1963) worked progressively to emphasize their anti-National
Socialist roots by using the SPD’s legacy as the only party to vote against the Enabling Act as well as
strongly backing President Heuss’ stance against German re-armament. Locally the SPD tended to
find its greatest support in the coal mining communities of the Ruhr regions, with its high percentage
of unionized laborers. Even though the SPD thoroughly disconnected itself from racist rhetoric, its
emphasis on unions placed its support on those with German citizenship, working for the good of the
ethnic group generally and easing the fears of those German workers worried about the influx of
migrant laborers. Considering the number of jobs the German government and private sector were
unable to fill in the post-war era there is reason to believe that fears of immigrants had their basis in
ingrained social beliefs rather than economic ones.
Similarly, the more right-oriented Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU)
worked to promote a platform distinguishing itself from National Socialist programs. Born
immediately following the end of World War II, the CDU was based on an agenda in opposition to
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NSDAP and was built by political leaders who had opposed the Third Reich even during the height
of its power. Christian-based in theory, the party aimed to apply non-denominational Christian
principles to the practice of democracy as man’s duty to uphold Christian ideals in society, a
complete anathema to the desires for Kulturreligion of German history and Nazi Germany.
Furthermore, the CDU platform includes tenets of environmental protection, a social market
economy, and securing equal rights and freedoms for citizens.148 Externally the CDU strongly favors
a European Union that is market oriented and supports the process of integration, though ultimately
its goal remains the protection of German values. Since the CDU is Christian based, generally its
religious base draws primarily from Catholics and Protestants who traditionally comprise the
religious element in Germany. To this day the party’s Christian based-agenda and voting base places
it in an antagonistic relationship with non-Christians, especially Muslim immigrants from Turkey, as
illustrated by its continued opposition to Turkish membership into the European Union.149
The CDU’s belief system creates a moderately nationalist conservative strain of thought, and
though again a race-based ideology is not explicitly part of the party’s agenda, the implications for
using race as political and social factors do exist. Political dominance of these CDU social and
political values at the time of the bilateral Gastarbeiter program implementation fully perpetuated the
notion that these “other” people outside of German values were never meant to settle within the state
as the emphasis lay on the ability of these people to return home. The central agenda of the CDU
focused on creating a Germany only for Germans and redeveloping old policies in new packages.
Gastarbeiter programs legally indicated that the usefulness of visiting workers lay in their economic
contributions, not social or cultural additions to the German nation. Re-iteration of a closed an easily
definable nation most likely contributed to the political appeal of the CDU under Adenauer.
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Initially the majority of the CDU’s political capital was aided by Konrad Adenauer, who cofounded the party within his home Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen. As a result, Adenauer and the
CDU both found a firm support base within the NRW and ably transitioned from local party to state
power with Adenauer acting as party chair until 1966 and Federal Chancellor until 1963. Although
Adenauer later operated as the face of the CDU at the national level, locally in NRW Karl Arnold
played a visible leading role, garnering substantial support for the party and steering the CDU
towards a nine-year dominance in the Land’s parliament and acting as Minister-President for that
same time period. Arnold also tried to provide the crucial link between political ideology and the
public sphere made by using the press. Often overlooked, in addition to his government activities, he
played a critical role in developing the press’ opinions of the CDU and the party’s political platform.
With Allied permission and British press license, Arnold established the Rheinische Post in
March 1946 with fellow NSDAP opponents.150 As one of a few major papers in NordrheinWestfalen, the Rheinische Post attempted to disseminate and support the Christian-based, panEuropean platform of the CDU. In an effort to increase political competition, the SPD also created a
press organ to counter the political influence of the CDU. Licensed in 1946 to Fritz Henßler and
Hentry Sträter – local politicians affiliated with the SPD – the Westfälische Rundschau promoted the
party’s desire to implement a socialist government. Both parties focused on establishing their
political positions in these papers, but little evidence suggests either the CDU or SPD directly
addressed the issue of citizenship. Instead they spent time competing for readership and increasing
circulation by printing articles about issues directly affecting potential constituents, such as the
economy.
The early establishment of these two papers provided an advantage in terms of readership.
Within the former British zone the Rheinische Post and Westfälische Rundschau were the only party
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papers to circulate constantly at over 200,000 copies, mainly within NRW.151 The struggle between
the two press organs to lead in circulation mirrors the political competition occurring at the Land and
national levels. In the immediate post-war period, the Allies carefully controlled and regulated the
number and content of licensed newspapers. In 1949, the Grundgesetz proclaimed Germany’s free
press and licenses became more widely attainable. The single year of 1949 to 1950 saw an increase
in the number of newspapers from 160 to over 1,000, and into the 1950s this continued to grow with
the average circulation reaching about 10,500 copies by 1953.152 Furthermore, it illustrates the
problems between the press, ideological dissemination, and popular participation. With fierce
struggles at local, Land, and national levels to sell issues, this competition consistently affected the
contents of all newspapers as they yielded their message to popular tastes in order to increase sales
numbers. Overall, non-political articles outweighed political ones, showing the population’s
weariness with politics and pre-occupation with economic needs. Most local and provincial presses –
which accounted for 50 percent of publications – seldom wrote their own political stories, instead
obtaining and compressing leading articles from larger papers in order to keep down costs.153 The
Rheinische Post and Westfälische Rundschau were not immune to these effects.
Though high circulating, these party papers had to compete with the emergence of major
critical, non-partisan papers of NRW including the Westdeutsche Zeitung and Handelsblatt in
Düsseldorf, and Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in Essen. All three papers consistently show
strong sales numbers – which continue today – while engaging in article borrowing from major
national papers such as Die Welt and Die Zeit. The borrowing of these articles allowed the papers to
cheaply provide stories of national interest while avoiding partisan stories or supporting a specific
ideology. Undoubtedly, the CDU and SPD engaged in these tactics and focused on economic issues
over politics similar to the practices of other regional papers; it is unlikely these party papers would
151

Claus Jacobi. “The New German Press,” Foreign Affairs 32, no. 2 (1954): 326.
Ibid., 325.
153
Ibid.
152

104

have reached their sales numbers by traditional means or highly politicizing themselves. An inability
to sell political messages designed to instruct the population with new ideologies further illustrates
the failure of popular re-education. The CDU, SPD, and their politicians did not utilize this
advantage to press for a new identity because they did not have one to present. This failure,
combined with Germany’s free press law, and the employment of former NSDAP propaganda editors
at printing presses – they were the only individuals knowledgeable in the economics and logistics of
newspaper printing and production – created space for the eventual re-emergence of more radical
papers. This became a greater issue later in the 1950s, but early in post-war Germany, the small
number of newspapers allowed the CDU and SPD great flexibility and success in controlling the
political message.
Election results clearly show that in the immediate post-war period, the SPD and CDU
remained the most viable political options, though neither party gained a clear majority and public
support remained spread widely across the board.154 Two reasons come to mind when determining
why the political scene possessed two largely cohesive parties yet remained so fractured, and both
stem from the Fascist state’s blocking of the development of normal politics within Germany. First,
because the system only allowed the expression of a single viewpoint in the political sphere for such
a lengthy amount of time, the collapse of National Socialism saw the emergence of long-suppressed
opinions and thus began a scramble to create parties to express these beliefs.155 Secondly, all of the
political parties of the new German state formed so recently or had been inactive for so many years
that the competition to attract the public proved difficult in the official absence of the race-based
ideology previously defining the nation.
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In Nordrhein-Westfalen’s first election in 1947, the results clearly illustrate this fracturing
with the SPD gaining 32 percent, the CDU gaining 37.5 percent, the Freie Demokratische Parti
(FDP) gaining 5.9 percent, and an array of other parties gaining 24.6 percent of the votes, placing
Konrad Arnold in the Minister-Präsident position.156 Over the next twelve years (three election
periods) Arnold and the CDU in the NWR – taking their cue from Adenauer and the party’s state
organization – worked tirelessly to increase their share of the votes by competing with the SPD for
votes from parties in the Other category. Overall in NWR, the FDP as a liberal upper-class
intellectual movement remained a negligible force of opposition to both the CDU and SPD because
of its elitist position, and both parties avoided stumping for these voters. In the Other category were
the struggling Kommunistiche Parti Deutschlands (KPD) and Centre Party (Zentrum) with 14.0
percent and 9.8 percent of the votes in 1947, respectively.157 This does not equal the total Other
votes though, and undoubtedly the last remaining percentage represents tiny splinter parties, perhaps
even crypto-fascists; remaining elements of the National Socialist movement with no legal political
outlet for their beliefs. Abolishing Nazism as a political option did not eliminate the corresponding
ideological sentiments. This task proved nearly impossible without a valid and clearly defined
meaning of German identity in the post-Nazi era. As a result, small groups of political marginalized
voters continued to exist.
By 1958 however, the CDU surged ahead with 50.5 percent of the votes while the other
smaller parties dwindled to a mere 3.2 percent.158 What most likely helped the CDU was their
unifying stance between Catholics and Protestants, which weakened the Zentrum (traditionally
politically Catholic) by pulling the Catholic vote toward a party with a proven successful track record
in economic restructuring and revitalization. The KPD in NRW faced even greater challenges,
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further weakening the voting strength of other minor parties. Emerging initially as a reaction to the
dissolution of the highly anti-Marxist National Socialism, the KPD simply could not deny the success
of capitalist market integration for rebuilding Germany’s economy or offer a viable competitive
alternative. Simultaneously, the onset of the Cold War and the intensification of the conflict from
1950 on made communism an unpopular political affiliation as party members became targets for
ridicule in the face of Soviet demonization, especially considering the proximity of capitalist West
Germany to communist East Germany. Industrialization of NRW also made it difficult for the KPD
to compete as the SPD offered protection for unionized workers and a less threatening socialized
democracy, drawing heavily from the KPD’s “proletariat” base.
This 10-year comparison in the voting records help reveal several interesting trends regarding
the role of political parties in post-war Nordrhein-Westfalen. First, the CDU had a natural advantage
inside the Land for NRW provided the party with its geographical roots. Konrad Adenauer, of Köln,
oversaw the creation of the CDU nationally, initiating the official first meeting in January 1946.
Within the borders of Nordrhein-Westfalen Karl Arnold, of Düsseldorf, led efforts to organize a local
Christian-Democratic party in his hometown; later merging this association with Adenauer’s larger
political movement. The principles and ideology of the party, therefore, remained closely tied with
the Land from which many of its most prominent members originated. When Adenauer and Arnold
both gained political positions of national importance the ideology of the party resonated in their
messages.
The de-Nazification process also bolstered the popularity of CDU leaders from NordrheinWestfalen. Like post-war Vichy France, the process of cleansing high-profile Nazis within Germany
generated the national myth of popular innocence and naïveté in the face of control and oppression
by the NSDAP.159 The understanding of collaboration and resistance grew to include different levels
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of participation from national level participation and implementation of Nazi policies all the way to
explicit and dangerous forms of resistance. Allied-created Fragebogen encouraged these
categorizations and the myth of resistance by placing Fragebogen registrations into one of 5 clearly
defined groups dependent on the answers provided.160 In the absence of established political
leadership, both Allied forces and the general population relied on politically experienced resistors to
lead Germany’s rebirth.
In this light, the idea of a few men performing acts of heroic suffering for the benefit of
courageous mass resistance became especially influential. Both Adenauer and Arnold derived their
initial appeal from this movement, celebrated for their past actions and the Germany they popularly
represented. Adenauer began his political career two decades prior to WWII as an active and visible
member of the Roman Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum). As mayor of Köln from 1917 to 1933 he
was forced to flee the city when elections provided the NSDAP with a political majority. Twice
imprisoned, briefly in 1934 and later in 1944, Adenauer remained a threatening figure to the National
Socialist party agenda, noted by Hitler as being “politically and principally inconsistent with the
views and aims of the NSDAP.”161 In Düsseldorf Karl Arnold also faced intense pressure and
government scrutiny for his political views. Like Adenauer, Arnold’s pre-War political activities and
personal beliefs led him to participate vigorously in the Centre Party. From 1920-1933 he sat on the
Düsseldorf town council as an advocate for the Christian workers. Never yielding to NSDAP
politics, Arnold continued to contribute to politically subversive actions, leading to constant
surveillance by the Gestapo and his eventual arrest in 1944.
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In post-war Germany, these very actions transformed both men from dangerous political
dissidents into celebrated saviors. The new foundational myth of Germany supported the CDU,
whose leading members’ wartime activities generated a social stature unmatched by other emerging
political participants. Even Theodor Heuss, as President of the Bundesrepublik, bore the stigma of
voting for the 1933 Enabling Act along party lines against his, later admitted, better judgment.162
Though the SPD’s Kurt Schumacher earned credibility as a resistor jailed for his political activities,
several factors worked against his ability to build a wide political majority across the BRD and
specifically within Nordrhein-Westfalen. Ultimately, a resistance legacy proved useful but not the
sole determining factor in political popularity.
Nationally, Schumacher and the SPD’s largest obstacles proved to be both the Soviets and
the Allies, especially the Americans. The formal division of Germany into the BRD and DDR
severely reduced the SPD’s constituent base since many of the party’s original members and strong
pre-War area now belonged within the Soviet-controlled DDR.163 Although the BRD contained
socialist voters – 32 percent in NRW - the territories remaining under Western Allied control
traditionally contained the more conservative and center constituents loyal to the Zentrum and
Deutsche Demokratische Partei before the Nazi era. As these conservatives and centrists looked to
move away from far-right politics, the SPD’s policies and programs proved too be too liberal and out
of touch with political sentiments. Increasing news of Soviet atrocities and treatment of German
citizens in the DDR also did little to gain Schumacher any sympathy or support for his socialist - and
often communist – agenda. Preaching socialism, Schumacher and the SPD found themselves
fighting a losing battle with the Allies. Certainly the pro-democracy sentiments of the CDU gained
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the attention and support of the Allies, especially as the Americans attempted to build a strong wall
against USSR. Adenauer’s obvious special relationship with the Allies proved a detriment to
Schumacher and his ability to run a successful campaign in 1949, with some speculation that the
Americans and French were specifically grooming Adenauer to streamline and strengthen his proCapitalist, Western, Pan-European agenda.164
The political microcosm of Nordrhein-Westfalen also mirrored these national issues with far
greater intensity. This particular Land historically provided the Roman Catholic Church with one of
the largest voting blocs within the country. Traditionally a conservative stronghold, the CDU ably
regained the group of voters lost during and in the lead-up to World War II. The firm beliefs of CDU
leaders combined with the backing of the Allied forces led the party to re-emerge legally in January
1946, created out of remaining elements of the Zentrum. To re-imagine the nation successfully,
former Zentrum leaders needed to re-imagine their own party, meeting the challenges and needs of a
politically diverse population. Filling the political vacuum left by the collapse of the Third Reich
required a party willing to meet the ideological needs of many social classes and ethnic groups.
Ultimately a Sammslungpartei (omnibus party) emerged, combining the basic moral principles of the
Catholic and Protestant faiths, middle class values, and social democracy into an omnibus
organization. The new CDU platform remained loyal to the religious element of the Zentrum, but
also stressed the necessity of economic development pledging to meet the needs of Germany’s
bourgeois class while remaining loyal to its Christian labor roots.
Still, beyond these Christian social and economic principles, the CDU failed to explicitly
define the new German nation or unequivocally reject the racist ideology of the NSDAP. This
remained problematic because the CDU could no longer assume itself a party free of racial
prejudices. Proving a lack of racial prejudice in Zentrum members prior to World War II is
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impossible, though the party’s Catholic values and continued opposition to the NSDAP clearly
illustrate an official dedication to tolerance. Changes in voting options, party availability, and
expansion of the CDU voter base, especially in Nordrhein-Westfalen, highlight the party’s post-war
ideological issues. Comparisons in federal election results from 1928 and 1933 create an accurate
depiction of CDU member composition prior to World War II and its effects on national identity
politics in the post-war era.
The elections of May 20, 1928 show a generally evenly distributed number of votes between
the two largest parties in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Zentrum and its historical rival the SPD.165 Trailing
slightly was the KPD and in a weak showing the NSDAP had a negligible following. Typical of the
region, Zentrum in NRW collected close to 50 percent of the party’s entire national share with
1,577,831 votes though within the NRW territory the SPD showed slightly behind with 1,175,700.
KPD voters generated a strong showing with 710,946 votes and the National Socialists gained only
72,533 votes in total.166 Comparatively, the percentages are as follows: Zentrum 29 percent, SPD 22
percent, KPD 13 percent, and NSDAP 1.4 percent. Traditional popularity and party loyalty explain
the large share of votes for Zentrum and the SPD, but the KPD’s popularity is attributable to general
economic dissatisfaction. The NSDAP’s low numbers at this time stem from an incohesive rhetoric,
lack of voter awareness, and trepidation about the party. An important fact stemming from this
election, however, is that the territory of Düsseldorf Ost – the modern capital of the Land – had the
greatest number of NSDAP voters in NRW with 19,962 out of 1,085,088 votes in the territory for a
percentage of 1.8 percent; slightly higher than the Land average.167
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By 1933, the unrelieved crippling economic situation coupled with articulation of the
NSDAP’s ideology caused a radical swing in voting numbers. The March 5 federal election clearly
illustrates the gains made by the NSDAP in a stunning, if not frightening, fashion. Like the majority
of Germany, the NRW elections show the Nazis earning the political support of the population.
Within a span of 5 years, the percentage share of the vote received by the NSDAP climbed from 1.3
percent to just short of 34 percent.168 The large change in NSDAP numbers and almost 1.6 million
increase in voter turnout indicates that National Socialist ability to radicalize and motivate the
German populace to participate politically. This change in turnout affected the percentage share of
the votes even as votes cast for Zentrum, KPD, and SPD numbers saw less fluctuation. Zentrum
dropped slightly to 26 percent, SPD tumbled to 13 percent, and KPD climbed slightly to 16
percent.169 Again Düsseldorf Ost presented the highest share of NSDAP support with a higher than
Land average of 37 percent. Even with strong traditional parties, the NRW political system
experienced the same fate as the national system. In a short span of time, the National Socialist party
convinced 37 percent of the German population in Düsseldorf - including over 1.5 million new voters
- to either support or overlook their racially charged ideology in favor of economic development and
promises of glory and strength for the – racially defined – German people. In November of the same
year, the National Socialists ran a final, highly orchestrated, highly partisan election with only the
NSDAP on the ballot. Though turnout numbers for the Länder remain unclear, the estimate is 92%
of votes cast nationally in support of the NSDAP and 7.8% of submitted ballots invalidated by
protest votes.170
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Considering the sheer number of NSDAP supporters, following the Allied occupation the
new reorganized CDU faced an intimidating ideological struggle. This is when the CDU maximized
public support by engaging in a comprehensive and inclusive political message based on Christian
principles and economic strength for Germany, as well as utilizing the history of the party and its
members. In Nordrhein-Westfalen, this policy building process generated the most clear and
troubling implications for contemporary Germany. In its new rhetoric though, the CDU failed to
confront the post-war issue of individuals who joined the party and brought their racial definitions of
Germany with them. In this environment, the CDU did not directly foster race-based ideologies, but
provided a safe haven for these ideas because the CDU did not counter these definitions with one of
its own.
On June 26, 1945 the CDU made its first appeal to the German people by appealing to the
sense and desire for national strength, a tactic the National Socialists perfected. Rather than framing
this nationalist ideology in racial terms, the CDU under Adenauer focused on re-energizing and
encouraging Christianity in Germany. Adenauer’s nationalism possessed pretexts of religious faith,
and the CDU pressed citizens to return to the “culturally formative and spiritual forces of
Christianity, and draw upon it as a source of strength for our people.”171 Within this appeal the CDU
quickly re-enforced the myth of popular German absolution, claiming the country suffered
“victimization of an insane leadership.”172 This message condemns Hitler’s treatment of the German
people by highlighting the sacrifices, suffering, and death forced upon them. This new foundational
myth created severe implications for the German identity, and a dangerous precedent regarding race
relationships. Fomenting ideas about German suffering without separately denouncing the
Holocaust, Anti-Semitism, or racism equalizes the experience of both groups and negates the unique
racial anger extant in National Socialist ideology and supported by the general population. The idea,
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therefore, becomes that the racist ideology was not at the center of the Reich’s failure, it was the
economic and political treatment of the German people. When the CDU promised “to expunge every
last trace of the system that is to blame for terrible sacrifice…and…misery,” those traces emphasized
were a crushing economic system and lack of political transparency at home, and a lack of political
co-operation abroad.173 This appeal discussed the rights of all people, as well as democracy, and
economic policy, but there are neither any direct negations of Hitler’s brand of racially motivated
nationalism nor a new definition of “German” identity.
Adenauer did work diligently over several years to build up support for the CDU, and sought
with varying degrees of success to impose his particular ideology on the party. Adenauer’s personal
beliefs stressed the dignity of the individual, considering communism and Nazism materialist
worldviews that violated this dignity. This belief often put him at odds with other CDU leaders who
supported a platform uniting Socialism and Christianity.174 In their system, economics and
democracy were the imperatives, not the dissolution of racial divides.
Following this mass appeal, the CDU’s general plan of action began spreading popularly,
especially in NRW. The CDU actually used the Land to launch its official political platform,
capitalizing on the popularity of “hometown heroes” like Adenauer and Arnold. On July 15, 1949
political elites unveiled their vision for the party and country in Düsseldorf, creating a set of
guidelines named for the city which played such a central role in NRW’s politics. These guidelines
set the standard for economic and social policies in order to differentiate the platform of the CDU
from that of the re-coalesced SPD. In this case, economic and social policies are not separate
entities, but overlap to institute a social market economy. Social policy for the CDU represented
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actively and aggressively decreasing gaps in wealth distribution, outlining a market concept
reflecting the party’s basic principles of an economy neither planned nor liberal-capitalist.175
Nothing presented in the social policy actively pursued policies aimed at repairing race relations or
the re-defining the German identity to force greater inclusion.
Düsseldorf played a central role in CDU development, because its voting numbers prior to
the National Socialist era made it highly receptive to a Christian-based party. Local political
sentiments provided the CDU with an opportunity to fine-tune the party’s message in order to
maximize potential voter loyalty and support. If the CDU could generate large numbers of registered
voters in Düsseldorf, then their message would ultimately prove popular throughout NordrheinWestfalen. The CDU threw its weight behind the influence of Karl Arnold, well respected in the
political arena by the center-right due to his long and successful career at the municipal level.
Admiring citizens of the center-right elevated Arnold for his resistance activities, though many
citizens celebrated the heroism of one of their own in the face of myths of suffering. To maintain
their political strength in the face of fierce competition from the SPD, the CDU purposefully avoided
racial themes for fear of blaming Germans for their participation in NSDAP politics. Such blame
would have alienated potential voters and weakened Adenauer’s ability to carry out his social market
and re-integration agenda for Germany. Unfortunately, this avoidance of racial ideology and its
result inhibited discussions about German nationality and bypassed a crucial opportunity for foraging
a new identity definition for “German.” Instead, the discussion revolved around generic discussions
about rights for all people and human dignity. Support of these two items does not equate to an
expansion of German identity, allowing the CDU to accept members who preferred to describe
German in discriminatory racial terms.
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Avoidance of redefining identity combined with the SPD’s less popular political platform
generated strong voter support for the CDU. In the SPD’s first public appeal following the war –
issued on the same day as the CDU – party leadership further perpetuated the suffering German myth
by preying on fears of political exploitation proclaiming, “the German people must never again be
abused as the trusting victims of unscrupulous political adventurers.”176 Consistently the SPD
referred to “the German people” in its appeal without providing any indication if their definition of
German identity encompassed the same ideology of the Nazi party, or if it rejected “German” as an
ethnic, race-driven term. The SPD also avoided issues of race and German identity, distancing itself
from National Socialistic rhetoric by “firmly rejecting any return to totalitarian thinking and
behavior.”177 From the Socialist Party’s appeal though, it is not apparent that totalitarian thinking and
behavior applied to the socio-cultural elements of Germany. Point one of the SPD’s agenda called
for “complete elimination of all traces of the Hitler regime in legislation, jurisprudence, and state
administration,” generally a removal of the National Socialist agenda from all levels of government
operation.178 Neither party then distanced themselves officially and clearly from racial agendas,
admonished Germans who adhered to such rhetoric, or offered a new national definition. The only
clear idea presented is that Germany must be different than it was before, focused mainly on political
and economic modifications.
Since the two parties did not compete over social identity definitions, the economy and
government remained the issues most likely to attract voters throughout the country and in
Nordrhein-Westfalen. In this Land the SPD came up short for several reasons. Initially, Kurt
Schumacher failed to capture the imagination of NRW citizens with his resistance activities because
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local loyalties created preferences for resistors from the Land with ties to the traditionally strongest
party. While the SPD eventually garnered many votes and popular interest, it is likely these voters’
backgrounds largely represented the lower-class wage earners of the industrial sector. The CDU,
however, still managed to win many of these votes with the promotion of its Christian labor roots.
Schumacher’s personal beliefs further contributed to the SPD’s weakness during post-war elections
in Nordrhein-Westfalen. His desire to implement a strong central administration, especially the
presidency, met with great skepticism and resistance by the CDU, Allies, and general population.
None of these groups found any appeal in re-instating a strong central government after the havoc
caused by unchecked behavior by Hitler. Popularly as well, Schumacher’s idea performed poorly
among a constituency which consistently showed strong devotion to local and regional ties over
national ones, especially in the face of Land restructuring after the occupation. The opposition to this
idea proved too great, and the approved version of the Grundgesetz in May 1949 contained a federal
system granting greater power to the Länder and representative legislative branches, and a weak
presidency acting as a ceremonial head of state.
Finally, the SPD under Schumacher strongly opposed the pan-European movements
supported by Adenauer and the Allies. Schumacher did favor a united Europe on his terms: a Europe
united by socialism and only occurring after Germany reunited and healed itself internally. 179 This
political opinion proved unpopular in NRW, where many citizens were eager to integrate with the
international community as a way to improve the desperate economic situation. Many bourgeois
business owners felt the CDU’s economic goals benefited them more directly and immediately than
the SPD’s. In this case, Adenauer’s push for urgent pan-European integration proved correct and
successful, leading to the Wirtschaftwunder and industrial revitalization of the Rhein-Ruhr region.
By 1960 industrial production had risen to two-and-one-half times the level of 1950 and far beyond
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any that the Nazis had reached during the 1930s.180 This policy success generated vital support for
the CDU over the next decade, significantly increasing the party’s voting percentage over the SPD in
both Land and Bundes elections.
By the end of the 1950s, although politically NRW operated as part of a multi-party system,
the only two real options remained the CDU and SPD, each attempting to define this new Germany
according to a set of social principles rather than race-based ones stemming from efforts to solidify
the state and its regions as economic powerhouses. A strong economy therefore rather than a
dominant biology made a strong people. In the end, in NRW the CDU capitalized on this best, with
Arnold using his connections to Adenauer and the strength of the party’s economic policy over the
SPD to support promises of strong economic development and the later success of economic
integration and international recognition as initiated by the CDU.
Numbers provide very little information about feelings and identity possessed by voters.
There is no way to tell whether people voted for these parties because they believed in the new
national identity message of the elites, or whether the votes went to these parties simply due to the
fact that there were few viable options to choose from. Economic questions largely guided the
political rhetoric of the post-war era, and the outcome of these elections may largely be an issue of
“voting the pocketbook.” Neither party openly initiated a revival of racist rhetoric, but nor did they
openly speak to condemn the practice of “othering” outside peoples. Race and ethnicity, aside from
defining German as a citizen, generally received little treatment, was ignored, and made a non-issue
rather than instituting programs aimed at promoting tolerance and integrating different segments into
society. Both parties seemed to believe that proclaiming themselves anti-National Socialist equated
to anti-racist, but this in fact does not change German national identity. Only a program that actively
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works to provide alternative outlets for anger and frustration, rather than using minority groups as
scapegoats, can properly re-imagine German national identity.
In the post-World War II setting, the articulation of German national identity emerged from
the collapse of the Third Reich very broken, indicating a flaw in German culture in Romantic
Nationalist terms. The fractured setting required the implementation of instrumental nationalism for
two reasons: first there was no well-articulated definition of the nation extant; secondly, instrumental
nationalism was the best option for preventing the re-emergence of a race-based ideology. Although
newly emerging political leaders deftly handled the economic possibilities, they let the matter of race
settle, a “touchy subject” that might only serve to reawaken hard feelings and re-introduce bitter
enemies. Without a leadership that proved to the populace that minorities can exist within German
borders without diluting the power of German culture, the government did not eliminate distrust and,
in some cases, hatred of other cultures. Try as they might to distance themselves from National
Socialism and its ideology, the government failed to change the general undercurrent of racism
within the state and therefore the national identity. The program in the international arena met far
more success as German leadership convinced the international community to re-imagine the identity
of the German nation. At this level, national re-imagination presented a much simpler task because it
did not touch on the very sensitive issue of what it meant to be German or what German Kultur
represented.
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EPILOGUE:
THE NEW GERMAN QUESTION

For the contemporary German state, this inability to re-imagine the nation beyond the scope
of popular nationalisms based in racial ideology presents severe implications for the state and how its
population interacts in present-day society. Over the last decade of 1999-2009, violent crimes
against immigrants, foreigners, and minority groups continue to grow in number and severity,
especially in Nordrhein-Westfalen, which remains the most densely populated of all the Länder. In
the year 2008, the Landeskriminalamt calculated that of the 4,668 politically motivated crimes, 3,349
of them (71 percent) had right-wing origins, an increase of 2 percent from 2007.181 These racially
motivated crimes show no sign of dissipating either, considering the number of immigrants to
Germany continually increases each year.
Recently, members of the government, not only the general population, have found
themselves caught up in xenophobic hype, and in NRW members of political parties are legally
limiting the cultural activities of minorities, rather than address the attitudes of the ethnic German
population, in an effort to stop the rising tide of violence. In April 2001, the Rheinische Post
reported that Interior Minister of NRW Friedrich Behrens (SPD) complained that Turkish immigrants
make insufficient efforts to integrate themselves into German society and that knowledge of German
language and customs should be made compulsory.182 In 2006, the government of NRW joined
seven other states in forbidding teachers in public schools to wear the Muslim hajib, a measure
passed by the majority CDU party. Measures such as these only reinforce the notion of “otherness”
through the desire to require all minorities to conform to government norms about German society; it
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is apparent that the politicians are following the lead of the ethnic German majority who are thus
defining the identity of the German nation.
Even those political parties long associated with anti-Nazi activity are not immune from
ethnically motivated rhetoric. Such comments and ideas are now gaining more traction within
majority and mainstream parties like the SPD and CDU, especially in Nordrhein-Westfalen.
Evidence for this exists in comments like those made by Friedrich Behrens, and the appointment of
Jürgen Rüttgers to the position of Minister-Präsident by the NRW Landtag in 2005. Chairman of the
CDU in NRW, Rüttgers made his views on minorities widely known, building his career on staunch
anti-immigration views and making headlines with quotes like, “Kinder statt Inder”(“Children before
Indians”) and proclaiming the superiority of Christianity. Until recently, sentiments like these
remained marginalized to parties like the National Democrats (NPD), who only gained 0.9% of the
vote in NRW’s 2005 election.183 Paradoxically though, as anti-immigration sentiment continues to
increase, the NPD may actually experience a decrease in voter support, drawn away by the major
parties. As this rhetoric becomes more widespread and acceptable among the political majority, the
CDU and some SPD members will continue to incorporate racially motivated language and platforms
into the ideology of the party. Unfortunately, the government succumbing to the racially based
desires of the population in this way only continues to validate, and condone, violent behaviors and
reduces these minorities to a subhuman status because of their condition of exclusion from the
nation.
The national unit, as simply put as possible, refers to the shared identity and culture of
particular communities.184 There is nothing political or territorial about the definition as such, which
requires the maintenance of specific boundaries or purity. The nation will occupy a territory due to

183

Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Die Gemeinden NordrheinWestfalens 2005 (Düsseldorf, 2005).
184
Richard Caplan and John Feffer, eds., Europe’s New Nationalism: States and Minorities
in Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 86.

121

its nature, but is not identified by its geographic boundaries or its political system within said
territory. Shared culture, customs, and history represent the true basis for beginning to define a
nation. These items though are not static, existing fluidly to incorporate changes created by time,
interaction, re-interpretation. The attempt to define the modern nation through the lens of idealized
past experiences negates these elements and denies the true cultural experience, futilely endeavoring
to implement a national ideal which never existed, indicative of the Romantic Nationalist model.
Such an approach seeks to impose a permanently defined structure upon the nation, reducing its
fluidity and increasing its resistance to change. The purpose is to provide the nation with the same
structural benefits that the state possesses; including sovereignty, political control, and a monopoly
on violence. This is not an unusual mission in contemporary society considering the widespread
practice of using the words “state” and “nation” interchangeably. The overall effect though increases
devotion to the state as a cultural container.
It is oppositely the nature of the state to act as an apparatus that has a monopoly over the use
of politics, violence, and the social division of labor within territorially defined boundaries. The
states comprising Europe today and the people within them often refer to themselves as nation-states,
creating many difficulties in the transition from individual states to a fully integrated regional body.
It is becoming increasingly clear however, that the ability of the EU to embody Pan-Europeanism or
Europe is impeded by issues surrounding the perpetuation of the myth of the nation-state on the
continent. If there is any single hurdle to the completion of integration and the creation of the
embodiment of “Europe” in one entity, that hurdle is undoubtedly the continued existence of the
myth of the nation-state on the continent, as evidenced by the difficulty in passing the recent Treaty
of Lisbon. The German state perpetuates this practice, using legislation, citizenship requirements,
and other tools granted by its sovereign status to protect the nation. The CDU and liberal parties both
continue to perpetuate this strong state apparatus with their programs supporting market integration
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of Europe but keeping at arm’s length when it comes to social integration as it infringes on state
sovereignty and may remove legislative tools designed to protect the nation.
This conflict is illustrated most recently by the government’s slow incorporation of European
Council Equality Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC. 185 After six years of heated argument and
three potential bills, in the summer 2006 the Bundestag finally incorporated these Directives into
federal law. Some of the arguments against these directives included attacking their pointlessness
because such discrimination did not exist, as well as warning that these directives would ultimately
promote discrimination. In German politics as well as in German society the disadvantaged position
of migrants or minorities is hardly perceived as a result of direct discrimination, but primarily as
caused by a lack of qualification or “human capital” of the migrants.186 Consequently, antidiscrimination provisions are not viewed as a viable solution to the “integration problems” of
migrants. The German government and peoples’ belief in the rights of the nation-state are obstacles
to both the integration of minorities into society, as well as German integration into the European
Union.
Two issues firmly associated with the nation-state are those of sovereignty and nationalism.
Nationalism is a great force among peoples, used to tie those of similar cultural and ethnic
backgrounds together into a singular collective unit, the nation. Not only does it bind those people
together, but it also perpetrates the desire, even necessity, for self-determination based on the
uniqueness of the nation and desire to preserve those similarities and maintain their seeming purity.
To achieve these goals, the nation must have a sovereign state which more or less is coterminous
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with the nation. Sovereignty then is the political and spatial manifestation of this nationalism. To be
sovereign is to have a population represented by the political entity within a specific geographical
territory, the state. Therefore nations are cultural and states are political. The terms nation and state
have been used interchangeably, so much that their real meanings have been comingled; for too often
they are mean to express the same unit, giving rise the term and myth of the nation-state.
Contemporary nationalism as it exists is weak and used to maintain a culture rather than as a
means to achieve self-determination. By enabling a sentiment of nationalism, a government creates
the notion that they are protecting the interests of the majority nation and its culture to ensure their
own continued political success. By insisting on the purity of a national culture, Europeans are
consistently denying their own histories and the deep common background and culture they have
come to possess, including those ties and bonds with the “other.” These include Jews, Gypsies, other
traditionally European Christian groups, and ethnic and religious minorities with former colonial ties
to the continent. Sovereign political boundaries are incapable of containing a culture and preventing
the infusion of foreign elements into that culture.
The persistence of the idea of the nation-state then is rooted in the misrepresentation of
nationalism. Nation-states have always been truly based on the existence of a cultural majority
within a territory, and not a cultural purity. For many governments, the claim to legitimacy is based
on homogenous popular unity and sovereignty based on that unity.187 Culturally, the German
language distinguishes Staatsangehörigkeit from Nationalität, citizenship from ethnic identity,
though politically it still very much allows one to inform the other.188
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law, one cannot be granted citizenship without first receiving recognition as a member of the German
nation. Divisions of civilian loyalty within the sphere of mass politics are present at local, regional,
and national levels, while the elitist sphere resides both at the national and supranational levels of
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European society.189 This remains especially true at the popular level where fears pertaining to high
levels of immigration and the dissolution of existing cultures due to the admittance of other values
and traditions are very much ingrained. These German fears do not exist in a vacuum, however, and
this pattern of misrepresenting the nation in support of the nation-state exists across the continent.
Many European state leaders are hesitant to openly support Turkish inclusion to the Union
because of sentiments expressed by their constituents on the popular level. With the already high
levels of Turkish immigration to Western Europe and the existing backlash against that segment of
society, the elites are aware of the popular fear that the entrance of Turkey to the EU and its ability to
be party to the Schengen Agreement will only provide greater opportunity for Turkish immigrants to
enter these countries – now legally. Surface arguments concentrate on effects to the job market:
rising unemployment rates, lower incomes, status, benefits and opportunities of the native
population. This breeds fear of racial “war,” that is the debasement of European culture and
civilization driving the arguments against the EU Equality Directives. An opinion poll conducted by
the Eurobarometer in June 2005 showed that seventy-eight percent of Austrians feared an increase in
immigration, with similar numbers in both Germany and France.190 German attitudes towards
discrimination also prove troubling. While heated debates about Directive 2000/78/EC occurred,
Eurobarometer conducted another poll comparing attitudes towards discrimination in the EU.
Startlingly, the results showed that the number of Germans opposing discrimination was
proportionally lower than in any other EU state. While the Union average of all Europeans was 82
percent, Eurobarometer found that only 68 percent of Germans rejected discrimination.191 What this
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indicates is a deep lack of sympathy regarding culturally ingrained discrimination and is a sign of the
pervasiveness of German ideology in society.
Statistics regarding the number of violent crimes reported have surely been increasing as well
given the number of incidents reported by the international media. Official documents released by
German police departments of each Land make it difficult to tell though, as the number of crimes
committed based on race, sex, or ethnicity are social designations and it is the decision of the Land’s
judicial affairs officer whether or not to release such statistics.192 This example regarding the
reluctance to implicate Germans for hate-crimes provides more evidence for the damage done by the
programs of de-Nazification, instrumental nationalism, and the suppression of German memory.
Without such a political and social discussion in the immediate post-war period, the German
populace was unable to face its past and therefore remained blissfully ignorant regarding the role of
the general population in the perpetration of National Socialist policies.
The Romantic understanding and definition of the German nation never received the negation
at the popular level necessary to disintegrate such popularly ingrained myths of biological
superiority, defects of modernity, and such cultural despair. The decade of the 1950’s offered
Germany the ability to re-imagine itself though the new program of instrumental nationalism only
served to suppress such a Weltanschauung rather than re-formulate the popular understanding of
German identity, as evidenced by the study of Nordrhein-Westfalen and the inability to provide for a
new ethnic presence socially and politically even though it accommodated for them economically.
Immigrants in this capacity remain working tools and not individuals capable of joining the German
nation. Overall, Germany remains susceptible to strains of Romantic Nationalism, focusing on the
transition of pre-modern to modern to post-modern. This transference occurred in such a way that
the values of organic primordialism still remain and the emergence of a nationalism in contemporary
192
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Germany illustrates a genuine sublimation between pre-modern and post-modern forms of
nationalism and the capacity for violence against minorities and the “Other” appears to grow on a
daily basis.
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